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Abstract
This dissertation outlines several important issues concerning end of life decisions and 
the severely handicapped neonates. The value of life, decision making and euthanasia 
are analysed in order to arrive at a best possible scenario for severely handicapped 
neonates in the future. The first task has been to analyse the problems faced by severely 
handicapped neonates and non-autonomous persons. The question of non-autonomous 
human beings’ value of life and whether they can be considered persons has been 
discussed. It is undoubtedly difficult to assess the quality of life for non-autonomous 
persons however; by using philosophical analysis, it has been shown that they do have a 
value of life and that they are indeed persons. The second question that has been raised 
is decision making. This issue is complex because decisions lie with surrogate decision 
makers. In order to arrive at the best possible solution for the neonates, the views of the 
parents, courts, and medical staff need to be examined. The third question is 
euthanasia. Although euthanasia is not recommended for severely handicapped 
neonates, it can be argued through ethical considerations that it may be morally 
permissible. Finally, by analysing the problems raised at each stage, the possible trend 
for severely handicapped neonates is discussed. The thesis concludes with the thought 
that genetic screening and gene therapy may be the solution in the near future.
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Introduction
Many of us find it difficult to associate with severely handicapped neonates. The 
difficulties lie in comprehending their physical and psychological condition, and in 
appreciating their struggle to maintain their lives. It is easier for the rest of us, that are 
bom normal and healthy, to assume that the severely handicapped neonates’ lives are 
lives that are not worth living. We merely observe their condition or, at best, try to take 
care of them as much as we can. However, the visual impact of their sometimes severe 
handicap, leads us to believe that perhaps they are better off dead. This thesis tries to 
point otherwise, and holds the view that severely handicapped neonates have a life 
worth living, although this depends on the severity of the handicap, and more 
importantly, have a right to life. The difficulty arises with foetuses detected with 
anomalies. Even if they are detected to have severe handicaps they may have the 
potential to lead a life worth living. The decision to terminate or to not terminate a 
pregnancy will lie with the parents. For without family cooperation it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for these infants to have a life worth living.
The value of severely handicapped neonates is an even harder question. They do not 
have, and most likely will never have, a socio-economic function. If they have a value 
at all it would be because they bring out the more benevolent side of society, and 
because they have the ability to enjoy life within their means. It would be morally 
wrong of us to deny them at least the opportunity to try to develop their capabilities, 
like making value judgements concerning themselves. This can be in the most basic 
form of moral or Tiking-values’. So long as neonates can appreciate life within their 
capacity, they have a value of life.
It is however, extremely difficult to make life or death decisions on behalf of these 
neonates. Their non-autonomy makes it difficult, if not impossible, for us to judge 
whether they would prefer to live, or to be allowed to die. No one, person or group, can
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or should make these decisions. Since neonates cannot express their wishes, the best 
alternative is to allow the parents, along with the medical staff’s recommendation, to try 
to arrive at a solution that is for the best interests of the child. If it is agreed between 
the parents and the medical staff, that the severely handicapped neonate in question 
should be treated, then the treatment should be one that is of benefit for the child. On 
the other hand, if the unfortunate decision to withhold treatment is made, the method of 
allowing the neonate to die must be considered Most medical staff and parents choose 
to limit the treatment to ‘nursing care’ only, as it is legally permissible, and more 
importantly allows nature to take its course. Sometimes however, ‘nursing care’ alone 
may merely prolong infants’ lives unnecessarily, especially if it is in pain and misery. 
In such a case, it may be more humane to euthanise them through a lethal injection. 
Death will be swift and painless, thus allowing the neonate to die without suffering 
longer than necessary. There are, naturally, serious ethical questions regarding whether 
euthanasia should be made legally permissible for non-autonomous patients. The main 
problem deals with the fact that they are unable to express their wishes.
Most of us have been fortunate enough to be bom with the capacity to appreciate and 
achieve our aims in life. One of our aims should also be benevolence and kindness 
towards those that have been bom under less fortunate circumstances or conditions. As 
autonomous persons, we are able to fulfill their needs. Our aim in life then, is not only 
towards ourselves but towards others as well.
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1 The Worthwhile life for non-autonomous persons
The first thing that comes to our attention is that words such as ‘handicapped’ and ‘non- 
autonomous’ immediately places these people into a specific category. We already 
have an attitude of applying a standard phrase to a common problem of what their 
worthwhile life is. To tackle this problem, one must first try to discern what the 
worthwhile life for the autonomous persons is, then try to find a common ground for 
both autonomous and non-autonomous persons. In order to discern what the 
worthwhile life for non-autonomous persons is, notions like ‘values’ and ‘persons’ 
should be discussed. Happiness can be seen as a value that aspires both the autonomous 
and non-autonomous persons. However the main difference is that the non-autonomous 
persons can only experience happiness at a basic level. Autonomous persons can take 
the experience of happiness to a more complex and higher level. In this chapter, the 
severely handicapped neonates’ quality of life will not be taken as a separate issue, 
rather the neonates shall be included as part of non-autonomous persons in general.
The traditional philosophical view of the value of human life was seen to lie in the life 
of reason and rationality. However, this was written based on specific groups of people 
with an understanding that the people they were discussing about, were autonomous 
(self governing). Due to medical advancement, a larger range of human beings are kept 
alive, thereby necessitating a re-evaluation of the concept of the worthwhile life. 
Reason and rationality can no longer be the main basis of constituting a worthwhile life, 
for then we shall need to say that people without a worthwhile life are being kept alive. 
There has been however, a leniency in this somewhat rigid model of the worthwhile 
life. To illustrate, both Aristotle and Kant write that humans have a natural inclination 
to seek happiness. Reason and rationality will thus play an important role in promoting 
happiness for oneself and for others. There are however a range of values, other than 
rationality, that are values by themselves.
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It would be difficult to say, contrary to the Kantian view, that rationality alone is the 
human value, for then the perfect being would be a robot. We are more and have 
capacities other than rationality and therefore a wider range of values. For example, 
love and courage, which are not always acted out through rationality but are still valued 
for their own sake.
1.1 Values
What are values? There are a range of ways of understanding value: from the Marxist 
concept of value, Adam Smith’s theory of value in use and value in exchange, to the 
more basic human values. All the above contribute to the making of society, but the 
economic evaluation of values will not be discussed here as it does not have a direct 
correlation in determining what the value of the non-autonomous persons is.
In this discussion values will be analysed as preference and choice. For example, there 
are two types of values for humans; ‘liking values’ and ‘moral values’. An example 
made in Caring and Curing will be used to explain the differences:
...a man who values thrift and enterprise for their own sakes may either simply 
like to be thrifty and enterprising, as a matter of temperament; or he may approve 
of thrift and enterprise in himself and others, be ashamed of himself if he is 
extravagant or unenterprising, and so on. We can call the first kind Tiking- 
values’ and the second kind ‘ideal-values1 ’.2
1 ‘Ideal-values’ can be interpreted as part of ‘moral values’, although ‘moral values’ is a ‘very slippery 
term’ (DOWNIE and TELFER, ref. 2, page 8) Downie and Telfer write that; ‘Ideal-values certainly 
possess some features which are usually thought of as characteristic of morality. For example, they affect 
conduct: a person’s ideal values - his approvals - have a bearing on what he does.’ ‘Moral values’ will be 
used instead o f ‘ideal-values’ as the broader definition o f ‘moral values’ is more applicable to this chapter.
2 DOWNIE, R. S. and TELFER E. Caring and Curing. Melthuen: London, 1980, pages 7-8
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Both exercise preference and choice, and are applicable to autonomous persons, but to a 
lesser degree to the non-autonomous persons, depending on the severity of their 
handicap. The liking-value can be applied to non-autonomous persons, as they are able 
to choose between what they like and what they don’t when given a choice. The 
application of moral values, on the other hand, may be slightly more difficult in the 
sense that this will require reason and rationality. Thus, non-autonomous persons, in 
this context will have Tiking-values’, but lack in ‘moral values’ to a certain degree.
If we have the capacity to choose out of preference, then naturally we would choose 
things that would make us happy, if only for the pleasurable emotions and feelings that 
we can derive from it. Rational beings would not only choose happiness for themselves 
but their happiness would incorporate others. As in Aristotle’s view of the eudaimon 
life, we would also derive a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment when we have 
achieved this. If all values are equally valued for themselves, happiness would be the 
fundamental component for having a worthwhile life.
The following is a list of basic human values:
1) Autonomy in terms of having rationality and the ability to self govern.
Figure 1.1: Relationship between rationality and autonomy
Practical Reason Theoretical Reason
Self T" /ledge
Autonomy
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Autonomy allows for people to choose and make value decisions at a more complex 
level, such as with legal issues concerning justice (e.g. child custody cases in deciding 
who would be the better parent, and what would be for the child’s best interest).
2) Moral values, pointed out in the example set out in Caring and Curing, are what one 
believes to be right or wrong. This is a reflection of rational agents, autonomous 
persons, as they are capable of making more complex judgements that would enhance 
and influence themselves as well as others.
3) Happiness is a value, as humans have a natural inclination to seek it. It is attractive 
as it encompasses a range of attributes from the basic forms of happiness, such as 
pleasure derived from eating a delicious meal which is related to feelings and emotions, 
to the more complex forms of happiness derived from achieving one’s aims. A person’s 
happiness and emotions are bound up with those of other people in the sense that 
peoples’ lives are not only worthwhile to themselves but to others as well. People 
would normally choose happiness over pain, because of the positive feelings and 
emotions one derives from it, thus happiness will be the fundamental value for both 
autonomous and non-autonomous persons.
4) Kindness and benevolence could be values to aspire for. They are especially 
important when applying the concept of the worthwhile life to non-autonomous persons 
who are capable of kindness, and require kindness and benevolence from others in 
return. Kindness and benevolence are important for non-autonomous persons. The 
exercising of these values by autonomous persons will lead to the non-autonomous 
persons’ happiness. They can understand when people are acting out of malice, in 
contrast to kindness, as they can probably feel pain or happiness at some level of 
consciousness. Moreover, some non-autonomous persons may be able to show 
benevolence at least to the limited extent of smiling or being pleasant.
These basic human values depend on what one holds as an important value in one’s life. 
They are on a sliding scale, where people can have more or less rationality on one end
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(i.e. practical and theoretical reason), sliding down to the values of non-autonomous 
persons (i.e. kindness and ability to love) who have the ability to experience happiness 
and pleasure at a basic level. These basic values are not in order of importance but on 
an equal basis as they are values in themselves. We value the basic sort of moral 
capacity (i.e. kindness) as well as the more complex forms (i.e. justice) at an equal 
level.
Non-autonomous persons are capable of one or more of the above mentioned values, 
depending on the severity of their handicap. They are, for example, capable of the basic 
sort of moral capacity such as kindness and may have the ability to experience 
happiness to their maximum potential. If they are able to experience even one of these 
basic human values their life is worthwhile, since these basic human values would give 
meaning to their existence. If they are in pain and continuous misery they would not be 
able to feel happiness and may not, as a consequence, be able to act towards others in a 
kind manner. This would be applicable to autonomous persons as well. The basic 
forms of values have to be satisfied before one can discuss and appreciate the higher 
forms of values.
The severely handicapped persons’ capacity for moral life may not be existent, but they 
do experience pleasure from food, water and shelter, and have a degree of awareness of 
happiness similar to children. The comatose on the other hand, may be seen as not 
having any value in their non-active state. However their value does not necessarily 
diminish if one takes the view that the state of coma is similar to an autonomous 
person’s state of sleeping, or when they have fainted and lost consciousness. Patients 
who are in Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) may also understand happiness and 
kindness, at some level, although they are in a complicated state of falling between 
animals and the severely handicapped. We cannot determine whether they are 
conscious or not, but it is safer to assume that they are, treatment wise. The same 
would apply to most severely handicapped patients, including spina bifida neonates. 
One has to keep in mind that these neonates in the future may have the potential to feel
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the basic forms of happiness, and hence manage to live out their lives within their 
capacities. It would be dangerous to decide at such an early stage whether their lives 
are worth living or not.
It is difficult to determine whether severely handicapped neonates can or will ever be 
able to have consciousness, but as mentioned before with PVS patients, it is safer to 
assume that they will have the capacity to feel happiness at some level in the future. It 
does not seem to be within our rights to discern whether severely handicapped neonates 
are capable of happiness or not based on our standards, for their level of happiness is 
lower than the autonomous persons’. We would, for instance, feel happiness when 
relieved from pain. This is of fundamental importance in determining the worthwhile 
life for these neonates and other severely handicapped people. If their lives are going to 
be full of pain and misery, they will not be able to experience and appreciate happiness 
to their maximum potential. In this case perhaps euthanasia would be a relief for them. 
This is a matter of contention and immensely difficult to decide. What could be said at 
this stage is that if non-autonomous persons are capable of happiness at some basic 
level, their lives would be worthwhile for them and for others around them. For, as 
mentioned before, happiness does not only come from the individual alone but from 
others as well.
Graphs 1.1 - 1.4: Correlation between the degree of severity in handicap and the 
person, rationality and emotions.
Graph 1.1 Graph 1.2
Person
(100%)
Emotions
(100%)
0% Severity (100%) 0% Severity (100%)
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Graph 1.3 Graph 1.4
Rationality
(100%)
Rationality
(100%)
Emotions
(100%)
0% Severity (100%) 0% Severity (100%)
Graph 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 represent the concepts of person, rationality and emotions in 
correlation with the degree of severity in handicap. The higher the degree of handicap, 
the lower the rationality and the quality as a person will be. Expression of emotions on 
the other hand will increase due to lack of self control.
Graph 4 is used to combine graphs 1.2 and 1.3. The point at which the lines converge is 
where the common ground for both autonomous and non-autonomous persons lies. 
These graphs are purely hypothetical and may not apply to individuals. They are merely 
introduced to find a common basis of a worthwhile life that all human beings share. I 
have placed ‘Happiness’ at the crossing point of emotions and rationality as a basis of 
the worthwhile life for both autonomous and non-autonomous persons, because there is 
a natural inclination for one to seek happiness regardless of whether one is conscious of 
it or not. This is simply because human beings derive enjoyment and desirable, 
hedonistic pleasures from it. If one is too emotional, then happiness is not recognised 
due to the preoccupation with one’s emotions and lack of self control. On the opposite 
extreme 100% rationality would involve one being too calculating and concerned with 
acting in the correct manner. As a consequence, one would not be able to enjoy or 
experience happiness.
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1.2 Persons
Before discussing ‘happiness’ in some detail, the concept of whether non-autonomous 
beings are persons will be discussed briefly. The advancement of medicine has brought 
about an increase in the number of severely handicapped neonates that survive. Due to 
this, the somewhat rigid traditional concept of what constitutes a person has to be 
slightly modified, and loosened to allow for some variations in order to include non- 
autonomous persons. Otherwise we are constrained from even approaching the topic of 
their value as persons.
Non-autonomous persons, like senile patients, mentally deranged, and the comatose are 
persons because they are firstly; in the human form, and secondly; have characteristics 
of a person. They have the ability to make choices in at least ‘liking values’ if not 
‘moral values’. They have the basic functions as persons, but may lack in the more 
complex functions, such as having a socio-economic value, consciousness of morality, 
ability to interact with others and ability to express themselves through language. These 
functions are important in defining autonomous persons because they have the potential 
to use them.
The traditional philosophical view of what defines a person has only been based on the 
autonomous persons. Thus ‘persons’ were those that were able to function socially. 
People and children are social beings, therefore they require the above mentioned 
functions to coexist with others. The factors that contribute to being considered a 
person is used as a guideline for autonomous persons, and children that are maturing 
into persons.
The difficulty in determining whether non-autonomous human beings can be considered 
as persons can be overcome by using the concept of the graph 1.1 (please refer to page
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6). As the severity of the handicap increases, their value as a person deteriorates. A 
person is often seen as having consciousness, the ability to make rational choices, and 
have a social function. Senile patients, for example, will be seen as persons because 
they were persons to begin with and have a past of contributing to society. Moreover, 
depending on the severity of their condition, they will have the ability to choose and at 
times will be conscious of their surrounding.
Down’s syndrome children do not have a past of contributing actively to society, but 
can show important basic human values such as being extremely loving. They raise 
protective instincts from people around them and are given back something valuable in 
return by having a loving nature. They are persons in that they have basic human values 
and more importantly, because their lives have value to those around them.
Contrary to the above view, there are some radical opinions according to which:
fetuses and newly bom humans, whether they have Down’s syndrome or not, are 
not people, whereas older children and adults, including those with Down’s 
syndrome, are.... One line of argument is that a necessary condition for being a 
person, and thus for being owed the moral respect due to persons, including an 
intrinsic moral right not to be intentionally killed by others, is awareness of 
oneself or self consciousness. It seems plausible that the morally special 
attributes that distinguish people from animals and other entities to which we do 
not accord an intrinsic right to life require capacity for self-consciousness. 
According to this argument self consciousness is not morally important in itself 
but is a necessary condition of all the remarkable and distinguishing 
characteristics that endow people worth special moral importance and thus special 
rights. This argument supposes that all new bom infants, like all fetuses, are not
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self conscious and therefore cannot be people and therefore do not have an 
intrinsic moral right to life.
According to the above quotation from Kennedy and Grubb in Medical Law, self 
consciousness is the basis of a ‘person’. To support the above argument would mean 
that all human beings without self consciousness do not have a moral right to life, 
therefore it may be permissible for severely handicapped neonates to be killed. This 
does not seem plausible, for the argument omits to mention the concept of ‘potential’. 
Neonates have the ‘potential’ of becoming persons and hence developing self 
consciousness gradually. Self expression through the use of language and emotions is 
the beginning of self consciousness. The second problem with this argument is that the 
term ‘self consciousness’ is vague and difficult to apply to neonates.
It can be argued here that self consciousness develops as the neonate matures into a 
person. The same can be applied to handicapped neonates, although for them the 
development of self consciousness would depend on the severity of their handicap. As 
shown in the correlation in graph 1.1, the severer the handicap the lesser the qualities as 
a person. Neonates and severely handicapped neonates do not have full qualities as a 
person. Development will bring about the qualities as a person. This is difficult to 
determine, but so long as they have been clinically judged as having some potential of 
leading a ‘happy’ life, then it would be safe to assume that they will be capable of at 
least a very basic level of personhood within their capacities.
Although non-autonomous persons, like Alzheimer’s patients or PVS patients, may not 
have any self consciousness depending on the severity of the disease, they have the past 
of being persons. ‘Self consciousness’ is merely one of the elements of personhood, 
and should not be the basis of determining whether infants and severely handicapped 
neonates are persons or not.
3 KENNEDY, I. and GRUBB, A. Medical Law: Material and Texts. London: Butterworths, 1989, page 
927
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Higher animals may be able to display values similar to human ones as well. However 
since they are in a different category of species they will remain animals rather than 
humans. The value of having the ability to communicate and interact in society in a 
harmonious manner could be a distinction raised between basic human values and basic 
person values. Depending on the degree of handicap, non-autonomous persons will 
lack in one or more of these social skills. But then again, kindness is also part of the 
social value necessary in order to coexist harmoniously. If non-autonomous human 
beings can display kindness or any other basic human value, they should be considered 
as persons. This is because they are able to interact with others through their behaviour, 
despite the fact that they may have difficulties in communicating through language. 
Language and ability to communicate with others is an important social value in 
determining whether one is a person or not. Non-autonomous persons lack in language 
skills, but they can live in relative harmony with others without them, since their 
behaviour towards others will show how they feel.
There are instances when autonomous persons also do not act morally, such as 
psychopaths. They do not adhere to the moral guidelines, and as a result, they are often 
seen to be less than human, a ‘monster’, because they harm other human beings. 
Psychopaths seem to have less attributes as persons. For although they are in the form 
of a human, they do not act in the manner expected from a person. They are endowed, 
unlike non-autonomous persons, with all the qualities as a person, they are rational, yet 
they have chosen to use their rational will in a morally unacceptable manner.
Non-autonomous persons may lack in rational will and other complex ‘person’ values, 
such as social skills, but they do not harm others. They in fact require the opposite, 
which is protection. They may lack the traditionally understood concepts as a person, 
but make up for it through other important qualities; by having basic human values like 
a loving nature and selflessness. These values which are also important for autonomous 
persons, may even outweigh the difference between autonomous and non-autonomous 
persons. For although they may lack in rational will, socio-economic functions, the
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ability to express themselves though language, they will have valuable human qualities 
that are more important than the above mentioned social skills required as a person. 
Hence, what they lack is compensated by their more humane qualities.
From this context it can be derived that there is a scale. The scale would range from the 
more complex functions as a person, to the more basic functions. The optimum balance 
would be to fall somewhere in the middle, having an equal distribution of the range of 
‘person’ values, but the balance can be evened out even when the distribution is not 
equal. For instance, a Down’s syndrome child. Even if a Down’s syndrome child has 
only 10% rational will, if it has 20% ability to interact with others, 15% ability to 
express itself through language, and 55% emotions (caring nature), then the balance 
equals out to having positive person characteristics. Whilst the psychopath, may 
theoretically have full rationality, have no problems in interacting socially, and in using 
language, but may completely lack in emotions like compassion. Therefore, although 
psychopaths may be able to interact socially, they will lack in the human qualities 
expected from fully autonomous persons.
1.3 Happiness and rationality
‘Happiness’, as with terms like ‘Values’ and ‘Person’, is a somewhat abstract concept. 
Terms such as pleasure and desire are related to it. Happiness for the non-autonomous 
person has not been discussed traditionally, as it is only through recent medical 
advancement that the concept of the worthwhile life of humans has had to be redefined. 
The worthwhile life has been debated for more than 2000 years, and we have not been 
able to define what exactly it is. The general concept of happiness has stemmed from 
concepts such as reason. This can be applied to autonomous persons, as they are 
capable of rationality and morality. Therefore Aristotle’s and Kant’s views for
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example, can be applied to autonomous persons but to a lesser degree to the non- 
autonomous. This however depends on the severity of handicap.
Traditionally philosophers have taken reason and rationality as the basic component for 
achieving a worthwhile ‘happy’ life. Aristotle’s view reflected the social structure of 
his time. Women and slaves were not seen as capable of happiness (eudaimonia) 
because they were taken to be inferior to men, and because of their lack of education. 
Children were also seen as incapable of eudaimonia because they are still developing 
and have yet to cultivate rationality and self control. Children were somewhat 
exempted from his critical view of women and slaves, for although they are still inferior 
to men, their rationality and self control are simply immature whilst the inferiority of 
women and slaves is permanent.
Women were seen to be without authority, and would not adhere to reason. Thus 
women and children, like slaves, had to be trained to perform their duties in order to 
achieve eudaimonia, but of a lower kind This view would not fit into today’s society, 
but it nevertheless presents the view during the time of ancient Greece. What is 
important here is the concept of eudaimonia which Aristotle believed to be the ultimate 
aim for autonomous persons.
The eudaimon life has been translated into English as ‘Happiness’ which can lead to 
some confusion. The other traditional interpretation is ‘living and fairing well’. To 
understand what the worthwhile life for the non-autonomous person is, the latter 
interpretation may be more apt. An attempt will be made here to adapt the concept of 
the eudaimon life to non-autonomous persons.
Virtues and aims in life, for Aristotle, are seen as important for an eudaimon life, whilst 
reason is used in the social context. It is difficult to apply virtues such as courage,
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honour, wealth, and reason to non-autonomous persons. On the other hand health can 
be applied, for then non-autonomous persons are able to lead a worthwhile life. Non- 
autonomous persons will hence be able to live a eudaimon life by aiming for a healthy 
life in so far as they are capable of.
The loving nature of the Down’s syndrome child, for example, is also a value in leading 
a worthwhile life. It is a value that should be maintained, if not aspired, by both non- 
autonomous and autonomous persons. It represents a sort of innocence that the 
autonomous persons lose as they mature and become exposed to the harsh realities of 
the world. The eudaimon life for non-autonomous persons would no doubt be on a 
lower level, but the above shows that they are capable of achieving it partly, and more 
importantly through support from people around them.
The eudaimon life for non-autonomous persons would be on a more basic level. Firstly, 
their happiness is important. Their happiness will be based on having food, shelter and 
comfort. This is the first step to happiness for autonomous persons as well. Without 
the above mentioned basic needs being satisfied one cannot achieve happiness at a 
higher level. Reason and rationality will be difficult when faced with hunger, lack of 
comfort, and shelter. Once these basic needs have been satisfied, the autonomous 
person can aspire for higher aims such as becoming a politician, teacher, etc. Non- 
autonomous persons do not have ambitions as the autonomous persons do. They are 
‘happy’ when their basic needs are satisfied. They may also be able to recognise what 
food gives them pleasure, depending on the severity of their handicap. For example, 
when they are given a piece of cake, they may enjoy it immensely and feel happy. This 
seemingly small happiness contributes to an overall picture of happiness for them. It is 
no different for autonomous persons because trivial things such as viewing beautiful 
objects, eating good food, enjoying the company of friends also make them happy. As 
rational beings we should only eat healthy food, although these foods may not always 
give us pleasure it will be good for our health. Rationally, eating delicious food, such 
as gourmet dishes that for example taste wonderful but have a high fat content, is
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unhealthy for us. Indulgence however, does make us happy, because we do not 
experience it on a regular basis. Happiness therefore does not necessarily have to do 
with acting rationally. We are complex and not always rational. If we were capable of 
being rational at all times, we would not feel happiness in indulging in things that were 
not good for us. But the fact is that we cannot help but feel happiness when eating 
delicious food. If we adhere to rationality all the time, we would not experience the 
‘happy’ life.
To present another view of the concept of the worthwhile life, Kant has played an 
important role in presenting rationality and morality as the distinguishing factor of 
human beings. According to Kant, rationality and morality of autonomous persons 
allows them to: “Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law”4, thus for Kant, the above quote allows them to 
fulfil duty for themselves and for others. This would result in furthering the end in 
achieving happiness for themselves and for others. This is what constitutes a 
worthwhile life for the rational being. Kant’s objection to the concept of happiness is 
that if persons have natural inclinations to make themselves and others happy, this will 
no longer be a moral duty. He had no objection to people acting out of inclination and 
in pursuing happiness, but his point was that these were non-moral pursuits.
Duty towards others is important in maintaining and promoting a harmonious society. 
Non-autonomous persons will have difficulty in acting out of duty, as they may not 
understand the concept. Their actions will depend on their inherent character rather 
than from a sense of duty. On the other hand, autonomous persons can understand and 
value duty and use it to promote happiness for themselves. In this context Kant’s 
concept of duty is applicable. If one acts out of duty, rather than through natural 
inclinations, then it is purely to promote happiness for others. Hence the act conducted 
out of duty will be virtuous. In this sense, acting out of duty towards others has two
4 Kant, I. Groundwork o f the Metaphysic o f Morals. Paton, H. J. (ed.) London: Routledge, 1991, page 
67
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positive qualities. The first quality is that one is promoting other’s happiness and the 
second, is that one is also fulfilling one’s aim of leading a virtuous, hence worthwhile 
life as an autonomous person. In this respect of leading a virtuous life, Kant’s and 
Aristotle’s views are similar.
Happiness for non-autonomous persons will no doubt depend on the people around 
them, such as family and care givers. Thus, we have seen that the basic difference 
between autonomous and non-autonomous persons, is the degree of dependency on 
others. This is because non-autonomous persons are not capable of independence as 
their happiness needs to be achieved through help from others. The worthwhile life for 
non-autonomous persons will depend on the benevolence and kindness of people 
around them, which in Kant’s view cannot be considered as duty but rather as natural 
inclination.
Kant comments in his work Critique o f Practical Reason that benevolence and kindness 
are not moral values, if given through natural inclinations. This is because they no 
longer apply to the universal law in the sense that the act will no longer be a duty. The 
act will not be done out of obligation, and is therefore not binding on the will of every 
rational being:
Love to God...considered as an inclination (pathological love), is impossible, for 
He is not an object of the senses. The same affection towards men is possible no 
doubt, but cannot be commanded, for it is not in the power of any man to love 
anyone at command; therefore it is only practical love that is meant....To love 
God means...to like to do His commandments; to love one’s neighbour means to 
like to practice all duties towards him.5
5 Kant, I. Critique of Practical Reason, Part I, Ch. LH, 177. As cited by McGill V. J. The Idea o f  
Happiness. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, page 189
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He seems to change his view slightly in his work Groundwork o f Metaphysic o f Morals 
as he says the following:
It is doubtless in this sense that we should understand too the passages from 
Scripture in which we commanded to love our neighbour and even our enemy. 
For love out of inclination cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty - 
although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable 
disinclination stands in our way, - is practical, and not pathological love, residing 
in the will and not in the propensions of feeling, in principles of action and not of 
melting compassion; and it is this practical love alone which can be an object of 
command6
Contrary to Kant’s view in Critique o f Practical Reason, benevolence and kindness are 
moral values and therefore important. Benevolence and kindness may not be easy to 
summon up, and one cannot make oneself be kind or benevolent when one does not 
have the natural inclination to be so. But do we not try to be kind and benevolent 
towards others? It also seems that our social roles, besides duty towards others, 
encompass kindness because we are taught from a young age to respect others. The fact 
is we do try to be kind, such as by giving up seats for pregnant women and senior 
citizens.
Duty, in the strict sense, can be construed as something akin to chores; something we 
have to do although we do not want to. But there are certain duties that we may have to 
perform in the social or political context that can also be virtues (i.e. a soldier’s 
courage), whilst at the same time deriving a sense of satisfaction and pleasure. The key 
issue here is that virtues and duty are moral values. If we do act out of duty, in its 
strictest sense, society can function; but it would be a cold world.
6 Kant, ref. 4, page 65
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If one can act towards non-autonomous persons, out of benevolence and kindness 
through natural inclinations rather than through a sense of duty, that is the best. For 
then you make others’ ends your own without having to strive for it. It does not matter 
if one has to see the promotion of the non-autonomous person’s happiness as a duty, 
because the result is the same. There is though a belief that non-autonomous persons 
may understand the difference between when something is done out of love and care, 
and when it is done simply for the sake of duty.
It is better, in my view, to act out of kindness and benevolence towards people than out 
of duty, for then you have accomplished aims for yourself and others at the same time. 
This seems to be the basis of leading a happy life for both autonomous and non- 
autonomous persons. For non-autonomous persons, it does not matter whether they are 
conscious or whether they understand the concept of happiness, as long as autonomous 
persons do. They will know when non-autonomous persons are, for example, enjoying 
their food, or taking pleasure in walking in the garden. The autonomous person can 
also derive pleasure from seeing them happy. As the autonomous persons’ duty is to 
promote the happiness of others, it does not matter whether or not they take pleasure or 
feel happiness when they see happiness in a non-autonomous person. It can only be 
said here, that so long as one is doing something positive in promoting the well being of 
another person, it would be better if one can derive some happiness from it as well.
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1.4 Summary
This chapter has tried to determine what the worthwhile life for the autonomous person 
consists of. Happiness seems to be the basis for a worthwhile life for both autonomous 
and non-autonomous persons, since positive emotions can be derived from this. 
Happiness in terms of the traditional philosophical view cannot be applied to non- 
autonomous persons because their needs are different from autonomous persons’. The 
level and quality of happiness may seem to be lower compared to the autonomous 
persons’ standards, but this may not necessarily be so, as something trivial as getting a 
sweet, or an affectionate hug gives them immense pleasure. It seems that autonomous 
persons, because of their experiences, have different expectations and at the same time 
require more in order to be happy. When dealing with non-autonomous persons, we 
should also strive to be kind and benevolent, because it would give happiness to both 
parties. Perhaps Kant is right in saying that an act no longer is a duty if it is done out of 
natural inclination. But it does not follow that actions done out of inclination have no 
moral worth, unless we assume that only duty has moral worth. But this is not 
plausible.
Rationality for autonomous persons is an important value because we can utilise it for 
our own good and for the good of others. As mentioned before on the sections on 
‘Persons’, one of the differences between autonomous and non-autonomous persons is 
that autonomous persons are social beings, therefore Aristotle’s and Kant’s views on 
happiness for people can be applied. Autonomous persons have virtues and aims as 
well as a sense of duty towards others. For without these, human beings will not be able 
to coexist. Depending on the degree of severity in handicap, non-autonomous persons 
will lack in rationality and in understanding the necessity of a social role. If they do not 
have these concepts, they will not be able to be actively involved in the social context. 
This however, does not mean that they will not be happy and will not make others 
happy. Non-autonomous persons themselves can be valued for what they are, and for 
their capability for having one or more of the basic human values. If they lack in
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certain functions, natural to autonomous persons, it is the duty of the autonomous 
persons to work around this problem and ensure their happiness as they require it. 
Unlike autonomous persons, their needs in terms of happiness are simple.
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2 Decision Making
The rapid advancement of medical technology, has led to an increasing need for legal 
guidance in the decision making processes for severely handicapped neonates. The 
difficulty arises from deciding who has the most authority and knowledge of the patient, 
so that the best possible outcome can be derived. For autonomous persons this would 
not be a problem as the main decision making will lie with themselves. The advice 
given by the doctor will no doubt play a large part in influencing the decision making 
process of the patient, but there may be less need for court intervention as the patient 
will be competent to decide what is best for him or herself. Problems however, arise 
for non-autonomous persons, as the people around them have to decide on their behalf
2.1 Who should decide the fate of the severely handicapped neonates?
Before discussing decision making, a brief description on the difference between 
autonomous and non-autonomous persons is required. The difference can be
understood from the following description given by James F. Childress:
Two essential features of autonomy are 1) acting freely and 2) deliberating 
rationally...First what is the relationship between competence and these two 
features of autonomy? Logically competence might be viewed as a precondition 
of deliberating rationally and acting freely or as a summary term for these two 
(and perhaps other) conditions. A person suffering from mental defects, for 
example, that would preclude either acting freely or deliberating rationally would 
be incompetent to make decisions.1
1 CHILDRESS, J. F. Who Should Decide? Paternalism in Health Care. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982, pages 61-62
23
From the above description we can see that competence in making rational decisions 
and having free will are what distinguishes autonomous persons from non-autonomous 
persons. Non-autonomous persons require surrogates to act on their behalf, to arrive at 
the best solution for them, as they are not competent enough to decide for themselves.
Autonomous persons also have the choice of using ‘advance directives’, which are 
advance statements stating their wishes in the event that they are no longer able to 
express their wills due to their illness. The objective of ‘advance directives’ is to take 
into account the wishes of the patients when clinical dilemmas arise, as in cases of 
having to resuscitate a patient dying from cancer who also suffers from respiratory 
problems. Unfortunately the use of ‘advance directives’ is not possible with neonates. 
One way of perhaps using the concept of ‘advance directives’ is by preparing expecting 
parents with the possibility that their child may not be bom healthy. Doctors, nurses, 
or Lamaze class instructors could inform parents of the possibility of them having a 
handicapped child. This preparation may allow for parents to be more emotionally 
prepared if their child is bom with abnormalities.
Where decision making for non-autonomous patients is concerned, parents or next of 
kin are usually seen to be the best people to make decisions on the patient’s behalf. 
They are generally believed to know the most about the patient and to want the best for 
them. The problems here are, of course, whether the parents or next of kin do know 
best and whether they should have authority to decide the fate of their family member. 
For it is difficult to say whether family members are the best decision makers when 
emotions and egoistic reasons become involved. Egoistic reasons are taken here to 
mean that family members may want to prolong the life of their severely handicapped 
neonate, because they cannot bear the thought of having a part in ending the life of 
another human being.
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There is no doubt that parents should have the major say in matters concerning the fate 
of their child, whether it is aggressive treatment or withholding treatment, as they will 
have to bear the consequences of their decision. There are cases unfortunately, when 
there is a fine line between severely handicapped neonates that should be given a 
chance to live, and those that will not benefit from treatment at all. Interestingly 
enough, court intervention usually takes place when parents want their neonate’s life to 
be terminated, but not when they want it prolonged through extraordinary means. This 
is probably because of the general humanitarian code where lives should be saved rather 
than terminated.
2.1.1 Parents refusing treatment for their child
Court intervention is necessary when there is a clear case of dispute between parents 
and other groups concerning what would be for the child’s best interest. Other groups 
are taken here as medical staff, right-to-life groups, lawyers and so forth. In most cases 
concerning severely handicapped neonates, it is difficult to discern what sort of life the 
infant will lead if aggressive treatment was employed, but when disputes arise between 
parents and others it is usually because there is a marginal chance that the child would 
be able to lead a life that will be worth living. Life worth living is taken here as the 
‘happy’ life, whereby the child will be able to lead a satisfactory life within its means 
with minimum pain and suffering. All parties are concerned as to whether the life that 
the child will lead as it matures will be one that is worth living. More often than not, if 
the neonate’s anomaly can be treated, albeit with some neurological handicap such as 
Down’s syndrome, then the medical staff and courts would promote the life of the 
neonate. There are unfortunately cases, such as Baby John Pearson and Baby 
Alexandra, where the parents felt that it would be best for the baby if treatment was 
withheld. The problem with these two cases, is that both these babies’ anomalies were 
treatable, and once treated the neonates will be able to continue their lives without pain 
and suffering, as Down’s syndrome children.
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The case of Baby John Pearson, also known as the Dr. Arthur case, was clearly a case 
where alternative solutions for the baby could have been found and the death of the 
baby was unnecessary. To describe the case briefly, the baby boy John Pearson was 
bom at 7:55 am on the 28th of June 1980 in Derby General Hospital. The neonate, 
although healthy, was found to be bom with Down’s syndrome and was rejected by his 
parents. Dr. Arthur issued a note: ‘Parents do not wish baby to survive. Nursing care 
only.’ On top of this a pain killing drug was also prescribed although there was no need 
for one. Gradually the neonate’s condition became worse with difficulties such as 
breathing and three days later he died. Dr. Arthur was charged with murder, which was 
reduced to attempted murder during the course of the trial, and he was acquitted2.
For the Dr. Arthur case, court intervention came after the incident. Had the doctor 
informed the court of the problem of the unwanted Down’s syndrome child, the 
neonate’s life could have been saved. The question of who would foster or adopt the 
baby would naturally pose a problem. However there are couples who want to adopt 
these babies, as was found in the case of Baby Doe in Indiana, United States. The 
important point here is that the baby would have had a chance to live a healthy life as 
no complications that are usually seen in Down’s syndrome babies were initially found. 
Although Baby John Pearson may not have developed into becoming autonomous in the 
way of making rational decisions, he may have had the capacity to appreciate life in his 
own way.
Another famous case was Baby Alexandra. Alexandra, as known to the public, was 
bom in July 1981 in the London borough of Hammersmith. Unlike John Pearson, this 
neonate had life threatening intestinal obstruction which required surgical removal. 
The parents refused surgery with the view that the kindest thing one could do for the 
baby would be for her not to have the operation but to allow her to die. The Director of 
Hammersmith Social Services took the issue to court, where upon the child was made a 
ward of the court, and the operation was authorised.
2 See KUHSE, H. and SINGER, P. Should the Baby Live? Hampshire: Gregg Rivivals, 1994, pages 1-3
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Templeman LJ, held that if the child’s life was not going to be ‘demonstrably awful’, 
surgery should be performed.
...it devolves on this court... to decide whether the life of this child is demonstrably 
going to be so awful that in effect the child must be condemned to die or whether 
the life of this child is still so imponderable that it would be wrong for her to be 
condemned to die...Faced with [the] choice, I have no doubt that it is the duty of 
this court to decide that the child must live... There may be cases...of severe 
proved damage where the future is so certain and where the life of the child is so 
bound to be full of pain and suffering that the court might be driven to a different 
conclusion.3
The above statement made by Templeman LJ means, that it would be wrong for the 
court to allow the deliberate killing of a child, so long as the child has the potential to 
lead a happy life in so far as he/she is capable of. This statement, like the one made 
below by Vincent J of the Australian Court, is important and necessary in order to 
prevent killing in similar situations in the future, and to maintain the stance that no one 
should be the ultimate decision maker in deciding whether a life is worth living or not.
No parent, no doctor, no court, has any power to determine that the life of any 
child, however disabled that child may be, will be deliberately taken from it...[the 
law] does not permit decisions to be made concerning the quality of life, nor does 
it enable any assessment to be made as to the value of any human being.4
This statement shows the view that the court should not be involved in the allowing of 
the deliberate taking of life however disabled a child may be. There is a sense that 
allowing the law or anybody else to decide the fate of another human being would be 
playing God. This is morally wrong, as it would give a group of people control over 
another human being’s life that is innocent. Of course it is preferable that the law 
should not be involved at all. Court intervention should only take place when there is a
3 MASON, J. K. and McCALL SMITH, R. A. Law and Medical Ethics. London: Butterworths, 1994, 
page 150
4 Ibid., page 154
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clear case of dilemma between the wishes of parents, medical staff and other parties, 
and act as an arbitrator to arrive at the best possible solution for the patient after 
considering the various views.
One of the main roles of the court is to protect the rights of the children, as with the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933. Under this Act, killing a child by omission 
could be prosecuted as manslaughter or murder. In this case Dr. Arthur would be found 
to be guilty of neglecting the Act. There are however difficulties arising with this Act, 
because medical advancement allows for patients lives to be sustained, when they 
would have died otherwise. The rising number of neonates that can be prolonged 
through artificial means has raised questions on the quality of their lives. For although 
lives can be extended indefinitely there are doubts as to whether they will be living a 
life worth living, or merely existing. It is however, as mentioned in Chapter One, safer 
to assume that their lives will have some meaning as long as they have the potential of 
having one or more of the basic human values. If, on the other hand, the medical team 
is able to say without a doubt that the neonate’s life is going to be full of pain and 
misery, so much so that they will never have the opportunity to reach some level of 
happiness, then the withholding of treatment may be a more rational and humane 
option.
It is indeed very difficult for anyone to decide what is best for another person. Medical 
advancement is positive in the sense that by having the ability to extend lives, patients 
are being given an opportunity to regain some, or maybe all of the former functions they 
had. Or in the case of severely handicapped neonates, they may develop into a stage of 
being able to lead a life worth living within their means. The court will have to make a 
clear distinction between those that should have treatment and those that should have it 
omitted when there are dilemmas between parents and medical institutions and other 
groups of people, such as right-to-life groups. The guidelines for treatment to be 
omitted for certain neonates may for example, incorporate the following three points:
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a) Parents do not wish their child to survive
b) Severely defected mentally and physically
c) Child would not survive without medical support throughout its life (i.e. bedridden in 
hospital, pain and suffering though out its life)
Stringent guidelines will be necessary to ensure that the legal and medical system will 
not be abused and to safeguard against slacking of regulations that may lead to the 
‘slippery slope5. There is a danger that slacking of regulations may lead to the increase 
in the types of people, health wise, to be incorporated in the omission of treatment. The 
parents, the doctors, and the court have to agree that the child’s life will be full of pain 
and suffering even if treatment is continued or undertaken. There may be instances 
where it would be better for nature to take its course rather than prolonging life through 
artificial means.
Cases like Baby John Pearson and Baby Alexandra would mainly occur in developed 
nations where technology and financial resources are available. The moral dilemma of 
saving lives arises mainly because of these two reasons. Court intervention is important 
in that it presents a perspective from the right-to-life, and tries to analyse cases as 
logically and as humanely as possible. Parents’ judgement may be reached out of both 
emotional and economic reasons, and medical staff may base their judgement on their 
evaluation of particular cases. At this stage, an evaluation of these three views provides 
a basis for arriving at the best possible solution for the dilemma we face. Without court 
intervention we may face more unfortunate cases like Dr. Arthur’s. If a country has the 
resources, and as long as there are couples with financial capabilities willing to adopt a 
child, then severely handicapped neonates should be given the opportunity to live their 
lives to their maximum potential.
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2.1.2 Parents’ request for non-beneficial treatment
On the opposite extreme of parents rejecting their child, are cases where parents want to 
prolong the life of their child beyond advisable means. The physicians’ and staffs 
diagnosis of the neonate may be that the neonate’s life should not be prolonged since it 
would have to repeatedly undergo painful surgery with no chance of leading a life worth 
living or worse, may eventually die even with treatment. There are many reasons as to 
why parents may want to opt for aggressive treatment when their child would not 
benefit from it. Guilt, ulterior motives through a need to reunite an insoluble marriage, 
reluctance of having a part in terminating a life, last chance of having a child are some 
of the reasons why parents opt for aggressive treatment. In many ways, these can be 
seen to be selfish reasons for demanding aggressive treatment to sustain life, especially 
where pain and suffering for the neonate is involved.
As mentioned before, there are not many, if any cases of the court intervening in 
disputes between parents and medical staff regarding issues of the above nature. The 
main reason for this can be taken from the statement made by Vincent J from the 
Australian Courts, whereby:
No parent, no doctor, no court, has any power to determine that the life of any 
child, however disabled that child may be, will be deliberately taken from it...[the 
law] does not permit decisions to be made concerning the quality of life, nor does 
it enable any assessment to be made as to the value of any human being.5
From the above quotation, it can be seen that the courts hold the view that no one 
should have the power to deny others’ right to life. In addition to the law there is the 
Hippocratic Oath that physicians are bound to. Their duty is to extend lives, where 
possible, and defy nature rather than terminate life. The law will have difficulty in 
involving itself in such cases, and it is better if it does not. However as in the section
5 MASON and McCALL SMITH, ref. 3
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before, the question of whether neonates with severe handicap or illness with extreme 
pain and suffering will be able to have a life worth living still remains.
The main debate here is the pain and suffering that the neonates in question have to 
endure throughout the duration of their lives. If a treatment is of benefit to neonates 
with the possibility that they may be able to lead a satisfactory life, albeit with the help 
of the family, then naturally treatment should be given. Otherwise, the pain that 
neonates have to go through seems somewhat unnecessary. It would consist of futile 
effort, detrimental to already limited medical resources, and an additional stress on the 
medical staff that has to partake in the continuous application of the treatment. Parents’ 
wishes will play a large role as they are morally acceptable although not rational, and 
the medical staff has a duty to extend lives rather than end them. Unfortunately the 
dispute arises on whether neonates will be able to lead a satisfactory life free of pain 
and suffering during the time that they live, and whether the parents are making a sound 
decision based on the best interests for their child.
Two cases cited by Brody in Life and Death Decision Making will illustrate the nature 
and complexity of cases similar to the above:
Baby E was a term infant bom to a 28-year-old woman. It was her first child by 
her second marriage, although she had several children by her first husband. 
Upon birth, it was noted that the child had severe dermatological problems which 
were diagnosed as epidermolysis bullosa, dystrophic type. This skin disease 
results in painful blisters forming all over the body from minimal trauma, in 
esophageal constrictions which pose feeding problems, and an inability to 
swallow. Infection and fluid management is a major treatment challenge for such 
children. All of this was explained to the parents. It was also explained that 
while the child’s death was not imminent and while there are some reported cases 
of such children living to their early teens, the child would always be in 
considerable pain and discomfort and would eventually succumb to the disease.
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In fact, Baby E was obviously in considerable pain and discomfort at the very 
time all of this was being explained to the parents. The baby had developed a 
serious infection, and it was suggested to the parents that the pain, but not the 
infection, should be treated and the child allowed to die. The parents vacillated 
about this issue but eventually concluded that they wanted the child’s infection to 
be treated. They could not find any justification for not treating a readily 
correctable infection.6
The second case concerns a neonate suffering from hydranencephaly, bom to a 16 year 
old woman.
Baby D was bom to a 16-year-old woman who is unsure of the father’s identity. None 
of the more likely candidates has expressed any interest in the baby. The course of the 
pregnancy was normal, and the infant seemed normal at birth. However, it was noted 
by the nurses that the baby was excessively sleepy, cried continuously when awake, and 
fed poorly because of poor sucking ability. A neurology consult revealed that the child 
suffered from hydranencephaly, a congenital anomaly in which nearly all of the cerebral 
hemispheres and the corpus striatum are reduced to a sac covered by intact meninges 
but filled with clear fluid....All of this has been explained to the mother and the 
maternal grandmother. In order to be sure that they understand the baby’s condition, 
the staff showed them the transilluminated skull. The staff would simply like to keep 
the Baby D comfortable not ever providing nourishment, until the baby dies. They feel 
that if they use more aggressive treatment there is a chance that the infant will survive 
for some time and that these poor people will be required to take home a child who has 
no chance for any neurological functioning. The maternal grandmother, who would 
have the responsibility for providing most of the infant’s care, totally agrees. Baby D’s 
mother does not. She insists that the baby is alive, and she wants to take Baby D home 
and give the child as much love as she can.7
6 BRODY, B. A. Life and Death Decision Making. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, page 206
7 BRODY, ref. 6, page 203
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The obvious difference between these two cases is that one of the neonates has a 
neurological problem whilst the other does not. One will feel pain and discomfort 
throughout its life with no neurological impairment, whilst the other will have no 
neurological functions even if it survives for sometime.
The decision reached by the parents in the first case, Baby E, could be considered 
egoistic in a way. The child will be suffering throughout its life and will also be aware 
of its development and surroundings. The fact that they have two other normal children 
may be made painfully aware to Baby E as it matures, and the child as a result, may feel 
frustration due to its lack of physical capabilities. Baby E may have to endure 
psychological suffering on top of the physical pain it continuously has to live with. 
There is a chance that the neonate will be strong and manage to live a satisfactory life, 
in that it may simply enjoy the few moments without pain, and value life within its 
means. Yet, the fact that the neonate will develop with continuous pain seems 
inhumane. The problem is that the neonate has a limited life expectancy with no cure. 
The family will have to undergo psychological stress as they watch the condition of 
their child deteriorate, or if not, at least watch it in pain. The question is whether a life 
of continuous physical and later psychological pain is a life worth living.
The parents may feel a sense of satisfaction in simply having their child alive, and that 
they are doing the best they can to make their child better. This aspect of the parents’ 
wishes should undoubtedly be respected. They are being morally sound in insisting that 
infections that are treatable should be treated. No one however, can judge the pain that 
the neonate is going through. Parents, and medical staff have to act as surrogate 
decision makers in judging whether the pain that the neonate is going through is 
intolerable to the point that had it been older it would have voiced its rejection of 
treatment. At the same time, no one as mentioned by Vincent J, has the power to 
decide the fate of a child, however disabled it may be. Baby E is not disabled, it suffers 
because of the pain it has to endure. Pain can be controlled through drugs, although 
whether pain killing drugs are recommended for neonates is doubtful. If the parents of
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Baby E had not wanted it, like with Babies Alexandra and John Pearson, then the courts 
may have intervened and been in favour of withholding treatment if an infection 
develops. As Templeman LJ pointed out in the case of Baby Alexandra, the courts may 
be swayed to have a different conclusion, if they knew that the baby’s life was ‘bound 
to be full of pain and suffering.’ But this is clearly not the case here. The parents 
wanted their child to be treated.
For the case of Baby E, it seems that the parents’ wishes should be respected. The 
medical staff does not have the authority to judge that a life is not worth living although 
it may be full of pain. The fact that the neonate does not suffer from any neurological 
damage suggests that the child will be able to enjoy some activities that we hold 
valuable in our lives. Another point in favour of the parents’ decision is that the parents 
are willing to support their child at this stage. They may not realise the burden it may 
have on the family’s resources and the effect on their other children, but so long as they 
do want to keep the child, no one should have the authority to tell them otherwise. The 
parents will have to live with their decision, and will be the sole providers and care 
takers of the child. There may be a chance that the child will lead a life worth living 
contrary to the views of some of the medical staff. Last but not least, the parents want 
their child to have a chance at life. At least this part of the parents’ wish should be 
respected.
Baby D was bom with a neurological anomaly, meaning that the neonate will never be 
able to function normally. Besides being incontinent, the neonate will never be able to 
recognise love and affection, and little of its surroundings. Another important issue is 
the competency of decision making by the 16-year-old mother. The mother is still a 
minor, and will therefore, be unable to take care of the child fully. The fact that the 
mother says that she wants to raise the baby with love and affection, which will not be 
understood by it, shows that she has not fully understood the situation. The mother may 
also not fully understand the responsibility involved in caring for a child, and may only
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see the neonate as an extension of a doll that she can show to others. The main care 
will thus be given by the maternal grandmother.
If the neonate had been normal, there would not have been a problem, as the maternal 
grandmother would have taken care of the child until the mother matured enough to 
take care of it herself. But since the neonate has a serious abnormality the care taking 
of the child would require more attention than usual. Hence it seems clear that the main 
decision making should lie with the grandmother rather than the mother. The 
grandmother has to act as the surrogate decision maker for both the neonate and the 
mother, which is a heavy burden on her. If the grandmother decides to concede to her 
daughter’s wishes, then she will have the burden of taking care of a child whose 
continued existence would not be a gain for itself. The neonate does not have the 
potential of becoming a person, such as in finding any sort of joy in its existence, as it 
lacks in awareness towards itself and its surroundings.
Brody’s view that the neonate should only be given basic nutritional support and 
warmth, or if possible to kill Baby D by injection with potassium chloride, presupposes 
passive and active euthanasia. Passive in the sense that the neonate would continue its 
existence if aggressive treatment was adopted, but by withholding treatment it would 
eventually die. Active euthanasia will be in the form of administering a lethal injection. 
Either way the intention is the same, in that both seek the death of Baby D. The 
neonate was unfortunately bom with a severe neurological abnormality that cannot be 
cured, but it is not uncomfortable nor in pain as in the case of Baby E. It may be more 
humane for the neonate to have aggressive treatment if necessary, and let it live as long 
as it can, because it is not uncomfortable in its state. Even if aggressive treatment was 
not adopted perhaps the neonate can continue its existence in the usual manner by 
receiving nutrition and warmth required for its survival. The life span of an 
hydranencephalic baby is short, a few months at most. Would it not be better for the 
maternal grandmother to bring home the child and take care of it until it dies rather than 
choosing euthanasia?
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The consequence of the above option, is the attachment the family may end up having 
with the baby, resulting in psychological stress for both the young mother and the 
grandmother, although perhaps their conscience would be at rest with the knowledge 
that they did their utmost in caring for the baby during its life. The neonate, as pointed 
out by Brody, will not be able to recognise love and affection, but at least the family is 
able to provide it. Most neonates will have difficulty in understanding love and 
affection, but as long as they can live their short lives in comfort, this may be better 
than adopting aggressive treatment or euthanasia.
Cases where parents insist on aggressive treatment that are not beneficial to the 
neonates do not require participation of the courts as they are not infringing upon the 
law. The court cannot intervene in these cases as the parents’ intentions are usually 
good, and even if they were only for their own selfish reasons, no one has the right to 
authorise the death of an innocent child. The main decision making will lie with the 
parents as they will be acting on behalf of their child.
The burden on the medical staff also have to be considered, since they have to deal with 
watching and treating a neonate in pain. But their role would be to concede with the 
parents’ wishes even if it is against their beliefs of what they see as a life worth living. 
Although medical staffs advice is important, the advice they give should be based on 
medical expertise rather than on moral judgements. Medical staff, like judges are not in 
a position to pass judgement on whether a child’s life is worth living or not. The 
parents will have to take the medical staffs advice into consideration, and judge for 
themselves whether their child will be capable of leading a life worth living, and 
whether the family can cope with the decision they will make. The parents have to 
understand that their decision has to be made based on the child’s best interest rather 
than their own.
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2.1.3 Legal proceedings for unwanted infants
In the unfortunate circumstance that the parents do not want their child to survive, the 
court will have to intervene in order to arrive at a solution that is for the child’s best 
interest. A trial will be held between the state and the parties that do not want the infant 
to survive. As in cases like Baby John Pearson and Baby Alexandra, their chances of 
leading a life worth living, albeit within their means, are good. The role of the court is 
to decide whether the infant in question should get treatment, and if so, what the 
consequences are. As described in the previous section, the law will be inclined to 
support the view that the babies continue their existence, as the courts do not have the 
authority to allow the killing of children.
In the case of Baby Alexandra the child was made a ward of the court during the trial. 
The court however, has limited responsibility concerning the care of infants after trials. 
The caring of infants will lie with an agency of the community that handles 
handicapped children. The standard procedure is that a care order will be issued by the 
court whereby the infants would be placed under the care of a designated local 
authority. The usual procedure after this would be that these infants would be placed 
up for adoption or foster homes until a permanent home can be found. Another option, 
although not a favourable one, is to place them in institutions where they can be taken 
care of by a qualified staff The costs of maintaining these places are high and also 
unpleasant for these infants; as they will lack the love, affection and attention naturally 
seeked by children. It would be best if a home could be found for every handicapped 
neonate rejected by its parents, but the fact is that most of them end up in institutions. 
Infants like Baby Alexandra, who get publicity have higher chances of being adopted, 
but the rest have very slim chances of ever living with a family.
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2.2 Parental role in decision making
Parents are generally seen to have automatic rights over their children concerning their 
general welfare. Parents have the duty to care for their children in terms of giving them 
love and affection, feeding them, clothing them, providing them with education and 
health care. There are doubts however as to whether they should be the ultimate 
decision makers where severely handicapped neonates are concerned. According to the 
Children Act 1989 in the United Kingdom, the following applies to parents concerning 
their responsibility towards their children:
In this Act ‘parental responsibility’ means all rights, duties, powers, 
responsibilities and authorities which by law a parent of a child has in relation to
o
the child and his property.
But does the above Act extend to parents having the right to make life or death 
decisions for their children?
Neonates and young children are not thought to be able to make competent decisions 
regarding their welfare, though it is clear that they very quickly begin to formulate their 
opinions by expressing themselves through body language, or through limited 
vocabulary, on what they like and do not like. They are developing their autonomy over 
themselves. There is a problem for handicapped children however, as their 
development will be slow, or may never happen. This is especially true for severely 
handicapped neonates. The question of whether the neonate will be able to live a life 
worth living is raised, forcing the parents to make critical decisions on behalf of their 
new bom child.
8 JONES, M. A. and MORRIS, A. E. (eds.) Blackstone's Statutes on Medical Law. London: Blackstone 
Press Limited, UK, 1992, Children Act 1989, page 158
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Emotional status, economic status, religious beliefs and a variety of other factors 
contribute to the decision making process of parents. These parents will naturally be 
traumatised to a certain extent in finding that their child was bom with abnormalities. 
If they choose to keep the child, they will have to bear the responsibility of a child that 
will be dependent on them financially, emotionally, and physically throughout its life. 
There will be a substantial financial burden on them. If there are other children in the 
family, their needs also have to be considered. It may be possible that due to the 
infant’s condition, much of the attention will go to the infant rather than to the other 
children, thus making them feel neglected. On the other hand the family may develop a 
stronger bond because of the cooperation required by everyone.
There are a variety of factors that need to be considered when parents make decisions 
for their severely handicapped neonate. The first issue to consider is the neonate’s 
medical condition, such as whether the neonate will be capable of leading a life worth 
living, and whether it requires continuous medical attention. Other factors to be 
considered include the number of surgeries it will require, whether the treatments will 
be painful, and what the life expectancy is. Advice will probably be given by the 
medical staff as to what course of treatment or non-treatment may be for the best 
interests of the neonate. Following this the parents will have to quickly decide what 
course of action should be adopted.
Parents will be affected greatly at finding that the child that they had been awaiting for, 
was not bom normal. As was shown in the case of John Pearson, the mother was heard 
as saying to her husband, ‘I don’t want it’. The husband either shared her view or 
accepted her opinion, and advised the paediatrician in charge, of their wish. The 
neonate was thought to be a Down’s syndrome with no complication at the time. This 
was found to be false after an autopsy was performed following the neonate’s death9. 
Clearly this is a case where the neonate would have been judged worth living had the
9 RAPHAEL, D. D. Handicapped infants: medical ethics and the law. Journal o f Medical Ethics, 1988, 
vol. 14, pages 5-6
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court been able to intervene. The parents of Baby John Pearson may have believed that 
they were acting on the best interests of their child by opting for ‘nursing care’ only, but 
the statement made by the mother to her husband weakens their case. It seems that their 
reaction to their handicapped son was selfish. It is undoubtedly true that the parents 
need not have the burden of looking after a handicapped child if they clearly do not 
desire their child. Yet this does not allow them to make the decision that their rejected 
child should therefore die. There are other options for the child that can be considered, 
such as adoption, or government run institutions designed for children with special 
needs. Death need not have been the only solution for Baby John Pearson.
As mentioned in the previous section, there is the opposite extreme where parents want 
the life of their child to be prolonged although it would not benefit it. This is also an 
act of selfishness by the parents. Especially if it is clear that the child would be in pain 
throughout its life. The pain that the child has to endure may even be refused by a 
competent adult. In both of the above cases the parents are not making rational 
decisions in that they are not thinking in terms of best interests for their child Thus, the 
medical staff and/or the court has to intervene so that they can recommend alternative 
solutions or point out what the decision will mean to the neonate if they wish for 
aggressive treatment. There is a need for a third party to be involved so that they can 
assess the situation in an unbiased manner to deduce what may be the best for the 
neonate.
In most cases, except in Baby John Pearson’s case, parents would believe that their 
decision is based on the best interests for their child. Yet as mentioned before there are 
other factors such as family beliefs and background that will interfere with their 
decision making. We would like to believe that parents are the best decision makers; as 
they should have the natural feeling of kinship and bonding with their new bom child 
that would automatically lead them to want the best for their child, even though their 
decision may be painful for them. Unfortunately this is not always the case. Then who
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is the best alternative? Unfortunately or perhaps fortunately there is no one party that 
could be the best decision maker.
In 1984, in the final version of the Baby Doe rules in the US, the Department of Health 
and Human services incorporated a proposal from the American Academy of 
Paediatrics. The proposal recommended the adoption of an ‘infant bioethical review 
committee’. The committee comprised of the following members:
1. a practicing paediatrician, neonatologist, or paediatric surgeon
2. a hospital administrator
3. an ethicist or a member of the clergy
4. a lawyer or judge
5. a representative of a disability group, developmental disability expert, or parent of a 
disabled child
6. a lay community member
7. a member of the facility’s organised medical staff
8. a practising nurse.10
The proposal sounds promising, and may function well as an advisor from a third party's 
point of view. There are however, practical problems with such a committee in that it 
may be difficult to always have a committee ready on hand to make decisions within the 
limited time span given by the medical staff. The neonate’s condition may be such that 
the decision has to be reached within 24 hours. There also seems to be more external 
involvement than necessary. It is doubtful whether the following; a lawyer or a judge, a 
member of a clergy, a lay community member, are really necessary. They may confuse 
and broaden the issue unnecessarily, and waste precious time. Medical diagnosis will 
be the most important at the time, as it assesses the degree of handicap and the 
neonate’s chance at living a life worth living. Therefore, it may be more functional if 
there is an additional physician involved to get different medical views on the situation. 
Another fundamental problem is the limit in which the parent - child relationship can be
l0KUHSE and SINGER, ref. 2, page 178
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interfered with. The rights of the parents as parents, and value of parenthood will be 
usurped by the involvement of other parties. Downie and Randall in Parenting and the 
best interests o f minors write that:
...if parental decision making is in same way blocked - say, the child is taken out 
of the charge of the parents - then it is not thought that the child’s interest will 
necessarily suffer...Rather it is the parents’ interests which suffer when their rights 
of decision making are blocked. This argues for an interest in parenting as such.
Page’s claim is that ‘parenthood is seen to have a special value in itself and not 
simply as a means to the care and protection of children and the continuation of 
the human race. This special value constitutes the ultimate foundation of parental 
rights’11 ....Its fundamental place in human life is manifested by the obvious truth
1 a
that many people choose to become parents.
Therefore, although third party involvement is recommended for arriving at the best 
possible solution for children, the parents’ natural rights of parenthood will be eroded 
somewhat. Involvement by other possible decision makers will mean that parental 
rights and their interests will be interfered with. It can be argued that parental interests 
and their children’s interests are closely linked, thus there should not be a requirement 
for third party interventions. It must be pointed out however, that parental interests will 
diminish, where life or death decisions are concerned. The child’s best interest comes 
first then the parents’. The role of the medical staff, and if need be the committee, 
would be to point this out to the parents so that together they can arrive at a solution 
that would benefit the neonate.
Parental role in decision making for their children would usually take the highest place 
without question. No one should interfere with the way that a family may raise their 
child, unless the child is being harmed physically or psychologically from them.
11 PAGE, E. Parental Rights. Journal o f Applied Philosophy, 1, 2, pages 187-203. As cited by DOWNIE, 
R. S., and RANDALL, F. Surrogate Health Care Decisions involving Children, August 11, 1996, page 7
12 DOWNIE and RANDALL, ref. 11
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Otherwise it is better to allow them to value the role of family and parenthood. In cases 
concerning handicapped or terminally ill neonates, there may be a need for advice from 
medical staff and other parties. This would allow the parents a chance to view their 
situation in a more objective manner rather than based on emotions so that their 
decision would be a benefit to their child. At the same time the medical staff and other 
parties should respect the fact that it is the parents who have to live with the decision 
they make. Therefore, although advice should be given to parents, the final decision 
should come from them. If their decision is an infringement upon the law, the courts 
should decide on the child’s behalf on the best course of action. It must be stressed 
however, that interference from other parties should be kept to a minimum so that the 
intimacy between parent and child would be maintained as much as possible. The 
decision making for the child in question should be made within a small circle of 
medical staff and the parents, in order to maintain the value of parenthood and to 
uphold, as far as possible, parents’ fundamental rights over their child.
2.3 Handicapped peoples’ point of view
This chapter has so far been discussing the issue of severely handicapped neonates from 
the view of the autonomous person, namely the parents and the courts. The criterion of 
best interests for the child has been applied, so that whatever the decision may be, the 
result would be a benefit for the child. There are not, understandably, many sources 
from the severely handicapped peoples’ point of view. Those that are physically 
handicapped, however, show strong support for the right of life for handicapped 
neonates.
There are degrees of severity in handicaps; people that are limited to physical handicap 
are autonomous and can appreciate and enjoy life at the same level if not more than 
people without handicaps. But what of those that have more severe physical handicaps
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such as spina bifida? Most neonates bom with spina bifida are judged at the time of 
their birth that their life would not be worth living. This is because of the pain and 
suffering they have to endure, along with the numerous treatments they must go 
through, during their limited life span. It is important to know the severely handicapped 
people’s point of view, as the small minority that survived against the odds will point us 
in the right direction on whether their life is worth living.
Kuhse and Singer in Should the Baby Live? have cited two letters with very different 
views. The first letter was written by Mrs. Allison Davies in response to an article 
published in the Journal o f Medical Ethics. The article proposed a law reform that 
allowed neonates to die. The second letter was received by the American CBS 
television network after John and Susan West13 were featured in one of their 
programmes. The letter from Mrs. Allison Davies writes:
In reference to your items on the bill drafted by Mr. and Mrs. Brahams permitting 
doctors to withhold treatment from newly bom handicapped babies, I would like 
to make the following points.
I am 28 years old, and suffer from a physical disability which is irreversible, as 
defined by the bill. I was bom with myelomeningocele spina bifida. Mr. and 
Mrs. Brahams suggest several criteria for predicting the potential quality of life of 
people like me, and I note that I fail to fulfil most of them.
I have suffered considerable and prolonged pain from time to time, and have 
undergone over 20 operations, thus far, some of them essential to save my life. 
Even now my health is at best uncertain. I am doubly incontinent and confined to 
a wheelchair and thus, according to the bill, I should have ‘no worthwhile quality 
of life’.
13 Case o f baby, Brian West, with Down’s syndrome and esophageal atresia. Court order to treat baby was 
given without parental permission. Baby Brian West suffered pain and misery through out his 18 months 
of being alive. See: KUHSE and SINGER, ref. 2, pages 141-143
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However, because I was fortunately bom in rather more tolerant times, I was 
given the chance to defy the odds and live, which is now being denied to 
handicapped newborns. Even so, my parents were encouraged to leave me in the 
hospital and ‘go home and have another’ and I owe my life to the fact that they 
refused to accept the advice of the experts.
Despite my disability I went to an ordinary school and then to university, where I 
gained an honours degree in sociology. I now work full-time defending the right 
to life for handicapped people. I have been married eight years to an able-bodied 
man, and over the years we have travelled widely in Europe, the Soviet Union and 
the United States. This year we plan to visit the Far East.
Who could say I have ‘no worthwhile quality of life’? I am sure though that no 
doctor could have predicted when I was 28 days old (and incidentally had 
received no operation at all) that despite my physical problems I would lead such 
a full and happy life. I do not doubt that they were ‘acting in good faith’ when 
they advised my parents to abandon me, but that does not mean that their advice 
was correct.14
The second letter is based on the view that the pain and suffering the patient had to
endure was not worth being kept alive.
You posed the question to his parents, ‘What would Brian say?’ I would like to 
answer that question for Brian - 1 feel I have that right since I was also once a very 
young child at death’s door, undergoing excruciatingly painful medical treatment 
in order to save my life. I was also ‘tied down’; I also screamed for mercy for 
‘them’ (Doctors and my parents) to stop what they were doing - I screamed so 
long and so hard the medical staff took to taping my mouth shut to cut off the 
screams (which of course then merely reverberated inside my head)...Ask me 
now: ‘was it worth going through - do you appreciate what they did?’
14 KUHSE and SINGER, ref. 2, page 144-145
45
NO.
My answer for Brian is ‘Thank you Mom and Dad for wanting to let me die in my
own way, at my own time, with my dignity still intact.’
Death is not so terrible.15
The above two letters represent opposite views on whether the pain and suffering they 
had to endure was worth the life they lead now. The above letters may not be a very 
good definition of whether we should treat spina bifida neonates in the future. The 
character and outlook that people have; their present occupation, their marital status, for 
example, will undoubtedly influence their opinion. Mrs. Allison Davies’s life is a 
positive one because she is a fighter who does not let her afflictions interfere with her 
aims in life. She has the strength to make her life worth living through considerable 
effort and will power. In short, she has managed to make her life extraordinary and 
should be made a role model for other handicap and non-handicap people. The reality 
however, is that there are more people that may agree with the second view.
In a survey conducted by John Lorber, none of the young adult spina bifida subjects 
would want their children to be treated if they were bom with the same afflictions16. 
This could be in line with the opinion shown in the second letter, where the writer 
clearly felt that the pain and suffering was not worth the effort. This view is 
understandable and should be respected considering the fact that, had they been able to 
voice their opinion earlier, they would have refused treatment in the same way that 
most competent adults may.
15 Ibid., page 145
16 KUHSE and SINGER, ref. 2, page 145
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There is an important dilemma here in that none of us are in a position to judge whether 
one option is better than the other. An argument for treating all spina bifida neonates 
would be that there are people like Mrs. Allison Davies, who survived against the odds, 
and made her life worth living. She can be considered an unusually lucky case, for she 
obviously does not suffer from brain damage, and has a high IQ. It would be difficult to 
judge the IQ of neonates suffering from spina bifida. If this was possible, it could be a 
measurement used for selective treatment in the future; as those with an IQ of 60 and 
higher would have a better chance of leading a life worth living. They would be able to 
enjoy and feel some satisfaction at the aims they achieve; and find enjoyment and value 
in things in the same manner that autonomous persons do. There are ethical dilemmas 
in assessing whether IQ should be a basis for selective treatment, as this may raise 
issues of eugenics, for example, whereby only those with a certain IQ and higher are 
treated. Measurements based on IQ may also have the problem of ignoring the pain and 
suffering a patient has to endure during treatment.
What is important at this stage, is whether minority cases like Mrs. Allison Davies 
should be considered and adopted, so that in the future all severely handicapped 
neonates would be treated. The positive aspect of this would be that they would all 
have a chance at life. This course of action would not be economically viable, and may 
be considered as being a waste of medical resources that could be used more effectively 
in other sectors, such as for neonates that do have the ability to live a life worth living 
but require funds for treatment. Another objection to treating all severely handicapped 
neonates would be that, in the end of it all, the subjects may feel that it was wasted 
effort. This does not mean that all neonates suffering from severe handicaps should not 
have a chance to live, but their condition should be clinically analysed, whilst at the 
same time considering the wishes of the parents. If the parents do wish for treatment, 
then it should be given, for at least then the parents’ interests will be respected. It is 
perhaps cruel that the fate of these neonates lies with others, but this would be the case 
for any non-autonomous persons suffering from terminal illnesses.
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2.4 Palliative Care Teams - A possible solution for severely handicapped
neonates
Palliative care teams are steadily becoming adopted by affluent countries. It is being 
seen as a favourable development in medical institutions for terminally ill patients. 
Palliative care focuses at ‘comfort care’; “whole person or holistic care or care aimed 
not just at a medical good or a psychological good, but at the patient’s total good, or 
best interests.”17
It may be beneficial for neonatal units to adopt the same ideas for neonates that are 
either bom with an incurable illness, or are severely mentally and physically 
handicapped. The role of the palliative care team, or neonatology palliative care team 
(referred to as NPCT herewith), will be to keep neonates comfortable and free of pain 
as much as possible throughout their lives. Consultation with parents, who will act as 
surrogate decision makers on behalf of their child, will be important in order to ensure 
that the parents understand what the process of the medical treatment or non-treatment 
will mean to their child. The adoption of NPCT is seen here to be as a better alternative 
than adopting passive euthanasia that results in infants dying a painful and prolonged 
death due to their disease. This does not focus on the neonates’ comfort, but on how to 
speed up the process of death without breaking the law.
2.4.1 What the NPCT would comprise of
The NPCT should comprise of experts in neonatology to ensure that the parents can be 
given advise(s) that would benefit the neonate. The parents would be an integral part of
17RANDALL, F. and DOWNIE, R. S. Palliative Care Ethics - A Good Companion. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996, page 18
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the team to ensure that the value of parenthood, and intimacy of the parent - child 
relationship will be maintained as much as possible.
A model of the NPCT may comprise of the following personnel:
1. two paediatricians to give medical advice
2. practicing nurse(s) with experience and knowledge of neonatology
3. psychologist to help parents cope with their distress
4. developmental disability expert
5. the parents, acting as surrogate decision maker on behalf of their infant.
A NPCT should be ready on hand, and be assigned to the neonate that faces 
complications from the beginning.
The main difference between NPCT and normal palliative care team is that the first 
team will have a shorter time to make decisions. The time allowed for deliberating on 
the course of treatment may be limited by the pressing condition of the neonate. The 
palliative care team on the other hand, will have the chance of getting to know their 
patients better, so that their wishes can be respected. Once the decision to not treat a 
neonate has been made, the most comfortable way that the neonate should die needs to 
be discussed. A lawyer or judge may be necessary at this time to ensure that the law is 
not broken.
Naturally stringent guidelines should be adopted at this stage, to ensure that neonates 
are not subjected to unnecessary harm or threat to their lives. The neonate must have an 
incurable illness or severe physical and mental handicap, that has been clinically 
diagnosed by the paediatrician and nurses, that the neonate would not be able to lead a 
life worth living. Parents must give consent to their team’s recommendation. At the 
same time the developmental disability expert must agree with the paediatricians’
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analysis. There will be difficulties in judging whether a life is worth living or not, and 
there are morally negative implications by making life or death decisions on behalf of a 
neonate, but unfortunately this is unavoidable. What could be argued on behalf of the 
team is that their aims, like the palliative care team’s, will concentrate on child’s best 
interest and no one else’s.
2.4.2 Difficulties faced by and with neonatal palliative care teams
There will be moral and practical problems faced with and by the NPCT. The main 
problem will be that the team will have to make decisions based on their clinical 
diagnosis of a neonate’s condition and future potential. Firstly, they will have to make 
a decision on what the best possible chances at life a neonate has, and if it has no 
chance, what would be the possible alternatives. The team, in short, will be making the 
main life or death decision. This may present a heavy burden and emotional stress on 
them. Secondly, by acting as a team, the individual staff may sometimes be placed in a 
situation where they will be forced to agree with a particular method of course, which 
they may not necessarily agree with. Yet they may have to agree with the rest of the 
team, in order to maintain a harmonious working relationship with them or in order to 
respect parents’ wishes. There may be situations where it would be less psychologically 
stressful for them to agree to a majority view than to argue, especially where time 
constraints are involved. Thirdly, the establishment of a team may be such that team 
members will gradually have the same value judgements, hence becoming narrow 
minded. The staff may have initially had different views, but as the team works 
together over a period, they may come to accept, predict and/or respect another 
predominant view, thus resulting in the team having one strong view concerning what 
constitutes a life that is worth living.
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There is a critical danger in this, as the neonates’ chances of survival may very much 
depend on external factors, such as the hospital that they are bom in and the team that is 
assigned to them. Lastly the problem with NPCT, or having any authoritative decision 
maker for that matter, would be that the parents would naturally be inclined to follow 
their physicians’ advice. For it is easier for parents to believe that the team has the most 
knowledge and experience in the matter.
Dr. John Freeman noted the danger pointed out above, when criticising Lorber’s criteria 
of selection:
the parents who go to Dr. Lorber get Dr. Lorber’s side of the story and Dr. Lorber 
says he offers them a chance to go to the doctor next door, but the parents never 
make that decision. They go along with what he tells them and 75% of the 
children don’t get treated. I provide an equally reasoned and equally 
compassionate discussion to the parents and the parents go along with what I want 
to do and 95% of the children get treated. It concerns me greatly that a given 
child if bom in Sheffield has a 75% chance of being alive. And yet this is a 
decision made by the parents on the advice of either Dr. Lorber or myself. That’s 
scary.18
One way perhaps, of avoiding this problem may be to have a rotation of staff, so that the 
team will not always be comprised of the same members. This may be difficult in 
smaller hospitals, but possible in bigger ones, facilitating large neonatalogy 
departments. The changes in staff may maintain the individuality of each member, so 
that there will be different views concerning what is for the child’s best interest. The 
aim of this is to avoid teams becoming narrow minded.
18 KUHSE and SINGER, ref. 2, page 63
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2.4.3 Role of the NPCT
The role of the NPCT will be hardest when parents express the wish that they do not 
want their child to live. If it is a clear case of the neonate being a Down’s syndrome, 
with a treatable obstruction, then the neonate should be treated with or without the 
parents’ consent. Patient’s interest comes first then the parents’. If the neonate is 
diagnosed as having a terminal illness, or have a severe physical and mental handicap, 
then the parents’ wishes should be respected.
The NPCT will have to obtain consent in written form from the parents allowing the 
team to omit treatment (which would also incorporate withholding of basic needs for 
the neonate, like: nutrition, warmth, and fluids). The team should not however, simply 
await the death of the neonate, but provide it with comfort and relief from pain where 
ever possible so that it can die in peace rather than with pain and suffering. Baby D, 
mentioned in the earlier section, should be kept comfortable with necessary nutrition 
and fluids, but no aggressive treatment that would prolong its life needlessly should be 
adopted. Neonates in this situation should have their condition monitored and 
maintained in a manner that will ensure that they die without pain and through natural 
means. It may be possible for some neonates to be taken care of at home by the parents 
if they wish to. However, this probably will not be advisable to the parents as they may 
form an attachment with their child and find its debilitating condition unbearable. This 
may lead the parents to have unnecessary stress added to their already psychologically 
difficult state.
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2.4.4 Physician-assisted death and neonates
The current aim of palliative care is to provide comfort for the dying patient. 
Euthanasia, in many countries, has not been legalised so the usual form of care would 
be either to not resuscitate a patient, unless expressed otherwise by the patient, or to 
omit treatment. There may be times however that neonates will be in so much pain, 
that had they been autonomous adults, they may have asked to be allowed to die. Even 
if it has been agreed by both the NPCT and the parents that the best course of action for 
the neonate would be to let it die, it may not be possible to do so without pain and 
suffering. The illnesses, as in the case of Baby E, may be such that the infants will have 
pain throughout their lives thus making euthanasia through lethal injection a more 
humane option. Or there may be cases where it is not possible for neonates with severe 
handicaps to die without developing an infection, such as with Baby D. In both cases 
they will die with pain. A pain killing drug could perhaps be administered to relieve the 
pain, but this would also result in the active participation of speeding up the process of 
dying.
If a neonate is going though intolerable pain, even with the NPCT providing the best 
possible comfort care, then perhaps the more humane option the team could provide is 
physician-assisted death. The most important requirement is that the parents have 
expressed wishes for physician-assisted death and have consented to this.
So far, physician-assisted death for non-autonomous persons has not been legalised. 
The main objection to having it legalised is based on the danger of the system being 
abused. Patients that are not terminally ill, for example, may be euthanised on the 
belief that they are going through physical and/or psychological pain and suffering. Dr. 
Jack Kervorkian’s patients may come to mind. In order to safeguard against such 
abuse, a group of physicians from the United States have written an article called 
Regulating Physician-Assisted Death. The article proposes a policy where the role of
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palliative care teams or committees extend to authorising physician-assisted death to 
autonomous patients who are suffering from terminal or incurable illnesses as a last 
resort. The paper stresses that this procedure is only applicable to fully autonomous 
patients who are able to clearly express their wishes. This is to ensure that vulnerable 
patients, such as those that are not mentally competent, will not be at risk.
The policy has the following objectives and regulations:
1) to promote comfort care as standard treatment for dying patients; 2) to permit 
physician-assisted death only for competent patients suffering from terminally or 
incurable debilitating illnesses who voluntarily and repeatedly request to die; 3) to 
develop and promote practice guidelines for voluntary physician-assisted death 
aimed at making lethal treatment available as a last resort for unrelievable 
suffering; 4) to provide independent and impartial oversight of decisions to pursue 
voluntary physician-assisted death without undue disruption of the doctor-patient 
relationship; 5) to provide a mechanism for prospective committee review of 
difficult or disputed cases; and 6) to ensure public accountability.19
There are advantages and disadvantages in having physician-assisted death for neonates 
suffering from incurable illnesses or severe physical and mental handicaps. The 
advantages would be that the neonates will be able to die quickly, without pain. 
Secondly, although this is morally weak, physician-assisted death will be less stressful 
on already stretched medical resources, rather than using methods like awaiting natural 
cause of death. An argument in favour of physician-assisted death for neonates may be 
that whether the course of action is to withhold treatment, await death whilst keeping 
the neonates comfortable, or injecting with a lethal drug the result and intention is the 
same. Therefore the option that gives neonates the least pain should be adopted.
19MILLER, F. G., QUILL, T. E., BRODY, H , FLETCHER, J. C., GOSTIN, L. O., MEIER, D. E. 
Sounding Board - Regulating Physician-Assisted Death. The New England Journal o f Medicine, July 14, 
1994, vol. 331, no. 2, page 120
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The disadvantages of adopting physician-assisted death would be that the method is 
irreversible, hence the chances of finding out if a neonate’s condition will improve will 
be reduced to nil. If other options such as withholding treatment or awaiting natural 
death are employed, then there may be a chance that a neonate’s condition may 
improve, and treatment could be undertaken to increase the chances of leading a life 
worth living. The second disadvantage is that there may be an increasing danger of 
including neonates that do have a chance of living a life worth living into the category 
of obtaining physician-assisted death. Parents and NPCT may find it increasingly 
difficult to handle the pressure of the painful treatments that the neonate has to endure. 
It may become easier and less painful for the parents and NPCT to witness death by 
lethal injection than painful treatments. Hence the judgement of what is best for the 
neonates may be influenced by the efficiency of physician-assisted death. Thirdly, 
because the neonates are not competent adults, their fate lies with the decision made 
between their parents and the NPCT. The decision will probably lie more with the 
team, as the parents are likely to listen and follow what the team recommends.
It seems from the above, that although there are clear benefits from physician-assisted 
death for competent adults, there are higher risks involved for neonates and young 
children because they are vulnerable patients. The legalising of this policy may 
increase the risk of neonates that have a fair chance at life to be judged otherwise. On 
the other hand, it is clear that the neonates that are suffering, will benefit greatly from a 
swift and painless death. But since the threat to neonates with illnesses that are 
treatable or handicaps that are tolerable may increase, physician-assisted death is not 
recommended at this stage. This view may change however, as the processes for 
selective treatment for neonates with severe handicaps or incurable illnesses, are 
developed further. A more advanced medical prognosis may be able to judge the future 
potential of whether a neonate will be able to lead a life worth living.
To conclude, palliative care committee need not be made a special unit of the 
neonatology department, but their aims and roles could be incorporated in the
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department, so that there will be some sort of group decision making established. There 
seems to be a clear need for this, as having only one or two paediatricians advising on 
the best course of treatment or non-treatment for the neonate, may pose a stress on the 
medical staff. Having a team would also mean that there would be a better distribution 
of duties where members with knowledge and experience in neonatology or palliative 
care can advise the rest of the team on their opinions.
The problem of having a palliative care team incorporated with the neonatology 
department would be that the staff would require specialised knowledge on neonatology 
and a general knowledge on palliative care. This means that the already high costs of 
neonatology will get even higher. However, cost should not be an issue as the 
community has the duty to provide at least the minimum standards of palliative care in 
neonatology, to ensure that neonates also obtain a fair share of comfort care. At the 
same time, the advantages of having a NPCT should outweigh the costs, as faster and 
more thoroughly analysed decision making will be made possible by having more 
professionals involved. This type of team may be able to function faster at the decision 
making level than ethics committees, as they would have been assigned to the neonate 
from the beginning. The medical team at least will be ready to give their medical 
analysis on short notice.
If there are any problems with the team they would probably lie with group 
management. Pressure from other members and time constraints may hamper with the 
decision making. Or, if the team is comprised of the same members for every case, 
there may be the danger of having the members formulating the same value judgements 
on what constitutes a life worth living. Neonates’ chances of survival may therefore 
become dependent on the team that is assigned to them. Having said this though, the 
establishment of a palliative care team within the neonatology unit would be the best 
alternative to what is available at present.
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2.5 Summary
The aim of decision making is based on the child’s best interest principle, and which 
procedures should be undertaken as a result. Although it is difficult to judge whether a 
life is worth living or not, it becomes clear, after review of the role of parents, medical 
staff and courts, that our main role will be to ensure that the child receives the best 
possible care.
Where a child’s disease is treatable, then it should be treated regardless of the parent’s 
wishes. Otherwise palliative care is a solid alternative in terms of caring for the dying. 
However long or short the life span of the infants maybe, it is essential that their lives 
be made as comfortable as possible. There are naturally practical problems at every 
level of decision making. External factors such as time constraint and the involvement 
of too many people may confuse the issue. It is important therefore that life or death 
decision making for neonates be kept to the minimum involvement, namely the parents 
and the medical staff. The intimacy between parent-child relationship should be upheld 
as much as possible.
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3 Euthanasia and severely handicapped neonates
It would not be wrong to say that no one wants to die with pain. If we had a choice, we 
would opt for a peaceful death, with dignity. Euthanasia meaning ‘good death’ or 
‘mercy killing’1, is brought about by the deliberate taking of a life, with the aim to 
relieve the suffering of another. Euthanasia is based on two important factors: 
compassion from others and competent decision making concerning life and death 
issues for oneself. There are many cases where death is preferable to a life of 
debilitating illness. However there is a problem in that the issue of what does and does 
not constitute euthanasia is unclear. At this time, many types of act that result in the 
ending of another life are classified under euthanasia.
There are many categories under euthanasia, such as; voluntary, involuntary, active, 
passive, withholding, withdrawing, killing and letting die. This has resulted in a general 
confusion on the difference between straight forward euthanasia, meaning active 
voluntary euthanasia, and letting die.
The main concern for ethicists, lawyers, medical institutions and society, if euthanasia 
is legalised, is the danger of abuse. The aim of euthanasia, which is to relieve the 
painful sufferings of others in cases where death is preferable to life, is not morally 
wrong. However, there are ‘grey areas’ that require clearer definitions in order to 
protect those that do not want to be, or need to be euthanised. The biggest fear is of 
course a repeat of the Nazi holocaust. The danger arises through political, social and 
economic instability. Legalising euthanasia may lead to a down ward spiral effect 
where more and more people become incorporated under the category of those that can 
be euthanised. In the beginning it may only be conducted on mentally competent 
terminally ill patients requesting to die, then severely handicapped people who can be
1 KUHSE H. Euthanasia. In SINGER, P. (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell, 1991, page 294
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treated but would be judged as having a life that is not worth living, to slightly 
handicapped people and so on. The danger of this happening in reality is slim, but 
many people are skeptical because euthanasia has been abused before and still is. The 
first group of people that are vulnerable to abuse is severely handicapped and ill 
neonates.
We would obviously like to avoid any sort of unfortunate incidences occurring, but it 
would also be illogical not to allow euthanasia as we had already taken a step toward it 
by allowing the withdrawal of artificial respirator in the Quinlan case, which was, as a 
result, followed by legalising the withholding or withdrawing of treatment. The 
argument here is that since we have legalised some areas of passive euthanasia, why not 
legalise active euthanasia for competent adults who are terminally ill. The result is the 
same. A valuable counter argument to the above would be that it is not the result that is 
important, but rather the intent, cause of death and the balance between benefit and 
burden for the patient. For if it were the result that mattered, then the act of murder or 
manslaughter would be excusable as well.
3.1 Categories that should not be under the heading ‘euthanasia’
The word euthanasia, encompasses a wide range of terminology that do not always have 
to do with ‘mercy killing’ or a ‘good death’. Some practices may be more suitably 
placed under the category of ‘letting die’. The main reason for this is that the illness is 
the cause of death, and not the act itself. The act would be conducted out of 
compassion and clear benefits for the patient. The terminologies in question are; 
active/involuntary, active/non-voluntary, passive/involuntary, passive/non-voluntary, 
withholding and withdrawing of treatment. Active, is usually taken to mean that death 
occurs through the use of aggressive methods, such as through lethal injection. Passive
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on the other hand, could be interpreted as letting nature take its course, incorporating 
acts such as withholding and withdrawing of treatment.
3.1.1 Active/voluntary, active/involuntary and active/non-voluntary
Set out below is a table based on the differentiation of active euthanasia. It can be seen 
from the table, that as the participation of patient decision making decreases, the 
dangers involved in legalising euthanasia increase.
Table 3.1: Different categories under ‘euthanasia’
Categories
Criteria
Active/involuntary
S  :• :::
Involves: Competent terminally 
ill patients requesting 
euthanasia. Advance 
directive can also be 
used.
Patient could consent, 
but is either not invited 
to, or patient does not 
give consent to their 
own death.
Patient who is non- 
autonomous and cannot 
choose for themselves. 
No advance directive 
made before.
Does the term mercy 
killing fit?
‘Mercy killing’ does fit 
here as patient requests 
it, and is suffering 
psychologically and 
physically.
‘Mercy killing’ may fit, 
so long as it is a benefit 
to the patient.
Doubtful if patient has 
not given consent.
‘Mercy killing’ may fit, 
so long as it is a benefit 
to the patient. But 
patient has not given 
consent.
Decision is based on: Their own decision. Physicians and/or 
family members. 
Patient could be a 
minor.
Physicians and/or 
family.
How safe is it to 
legalise this category?
Safe. Doubtful. Dangerous.
Reason: Patient is competent 
enough to make
Social, economic and 
family burdens may
Social, economic and 
family burdens may
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decisions concerning obscure the view of obscure the view of
their own life. They what is best for the what is best for the
know what they want patient. I.e. as old patient. I.e. as old
and do not want in life. people, severely people, severely
handicapped infants handicapped infants
increase there may be increase there may be
strains on the already strains on the already
stretched medical stretched medical
resources. resources.
(Table continues from previous page)
An important point that has not been included in the above table, is that the only 
acceptable form of euthanasia is active/voluntary euthanasia. This is because when 
physicians make decisions along with their patients it is based on the benefit/burden 
factor. The same applies for patients that are no longer competent enough to make 
decisions for themselves but have expressed their wishes through family members or 
through advance directives. When patients’ illnesses are seen as a burden rather than a 
benefit, then the most humane thing to do could be to relieve their suffering. It must be 
stressed that their suffering comes from their illness and not death. Patients that request 
euthanasia are usually terminally ill, in pain both physically and psychologically, to the 
point that death would be a relief for them. Euthanasia would not be the cause of death 
but the underlying illness.
The problem with active/involuntary and active/non-voluntary is that the patients have 
not given consent to their death. It may however be that the patients’ prognoses are so 
poor that physicians cannot avoid judging that the patients would not benefit from their 
existence even if they were to survive. A swift and painless administration of lethal 
injection may be at times more humane than opting for passive euthanasia, which 
involves waiting for the patients to die in pain, while withholding treatment. Pain 
killers can however be given to alleviate the patients’ discomfort.
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There is a slight problem with the above however, in that death is certain once a lethal 
injection is administered, whilst passive euthanasia allows for improvements in a 
patient’s condition in the case that a physician’s prognosis was wrong.
To conclude, firstly, a clearer definition of euthanasia is required. Euthanasia taken to 
mean a ‘good death’, can only incorporate active/voluntary euthanasia, including 
physician-assisted-suicide, because only then will the death be good to the patient. 
Patients would have made the decision by themselves, have their wishes respected, and 
can die in a dignified manner. Active/involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia is not 
euthanasia in the most strict sense as patients in this category have not asked for death. 
Secondly, the physician’s intent in killing the patient is out of beneficence and non- 
malificence. Thirdly, if the patient is terminally ill or bom with a severe handicap like 
anencephaly, then the direct cause of death is not the lethal injection but the illness or 
severe handicap. Physicians in these cases, have judged through clinical diagnosis that 
the patients would not benefit from having their lives continued as they would only die 
with pain and suffering, or will not benefit from treatment at all. Rather than choosing 
passive euthanasia, where pain and discomfort may result, physicians may choose a 
more swift and painless means of death. Medical staff and family members may also 
prefer a painless death, through active euthanasia, rather than watching their loved ones 
die in misery and without dignity through passive euthanasia.
3.1.2 Withholding and withdrawing treatment
There is a general misconception, that withholding treatment is morally permissible 
whilst, withdrawing treatment is not. The reason for this is based on the Act and 
Omission doctrine, whereby the Act would be the withdrawing of treatment, and the 
withholding is the Omission. For both withholding and withdrawing the result is the 
same. Death results in both cases, because the treatment is either seen as not being a
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benefit but rather a burden so treatment is withheld, or treatment is withdrawn as the 
patient’s prognosis is poor with no signs of recovery.
Most medical staff find it harder to withdraw treatment rather than to withhold 
treatment, because of the action involved when taking people off treatments such as 
life-sustaining machines, or respiratory aids. This is mistakenly perceived as being the 
cause of death. This could be due to the visual impact of seeing the life of a person 
ebbing away in front of you whilst thinking that the switch you turned off resulted in 
their death. On the other hand, by withholding treatment, patients die naturally. Hence, 
there is a difference in the way that death results, in letting ‘nature take its course’ or 
through human intervention.
There are two other important issues that have not been mentioned yet. The first is that 
patients may benefit from having treatment. It usually takes a few days at least to 
determine whether the patient is benefiting from it. If the prognosis is good, treatment 
should be continued, if not, it can be withdrawn. Hence in cases where the prognosis is 
doubtful, it would be morally more acceptable to try treatment and then withdraw it if 
the patient is not benefiting, rather than not giving the patient a chance at all.
The second issue that is often neglected, or not widely understood is, what the cause of 
death is. It is often misconstrued, that the act involved in withdrawing treatment 
results in death, and is hence seen as euthanasia. The argument that would be made 
here, is that it is neither the withdrawing that is the cause of death, nor should the 
withdrawing of treatment be called euthanasia.
Firstly, the cause. The cause of death is the illness, not the withdrawing of treatment. 
The patient would have died earlier had treatment not been givea If a patient dies as a 
result of withdrawing treatment, it can be argued that the patient was dying anyway, and
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the treatment did not benefit him/her. The fact that treatment has to be given in the first 
place, shows that the patients were in need of some life sustaining treatment that may 
lead to them recovering some of their former potentials. If the patients’ condition does 
not improve then the medical staff have a right to withdraw treatment because the 
patients are not benefiting from the treatment. Secondly, this results in unnecessary 
high costs and stress for the family and medical staff. This would mean that the effort 
of maintaining a life could be outweighed by other socio-economic needs. It is morally 
wrong perhaps to put the needs of others, especially where money is concerned, before 
a life of another human being. It is also morally wrong however, to prolong the life of a 
patient who is clearly not going to get better, or is not improving at all but getting 
worse. Subjecting the medical staff and family to unnecessary pain and stress, both 
emotionally and financially, is wrong. In this case it seems logical that treatment be 
withheld or withdrawn.
In cases where medical staff would not provide treatment requested by family members, 
such as ventilatory support for a dying patient, Lord Justice Donaldson stated that 
courts:
should not require a medical practitioner...to adopt a course of treatment which in 
the bona fide clinical judgment of the practitioner was contraindicated. 2
Further to this, Lord Justice Balcome wrote that he:
could conceive of no situation where it would be [proper] to order a doctor to 
treat a [patient] in manner contrary to his or her clinical judgment.3
If the family’s requests are such that they object to the physician’s advice, then the 
patient could be transferred to another physician, who may be able to acquiesce to their 
wishes. The above two statements was also supported by the new Virginia statute
2 PARIS, J. J., SCHREIBER, M. D., STATTER, M., ARENSMAN R. and SIEGLER, M. Sounding 
Board - Beyond Autonomy - Physicians’ refusal to use life-prolonging extracorporeal membrane 
oxygenation. The New England Journal o f Medicine, July 29, 1993, Vol. 329, No. 5, page 356
3 Ibid.
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which upheld the physicians position of rejecting patient and family demands when 
treatment was not recommended. This clearly shows that more and more people are 
supporting the view that treatment can be withheld without it necessarily meaning 
euthanasia for the patients.
This leads us to the second issue. Euthanasia is misinterpreted to encompass a wide 
range of meanings that do not correlate to the original meaning of ‘good death’. There 
is an unfortunate confusion in the term due to the abuse of it by Nazis, and the word 
‘killing’. It must be stressed firstly that ‘killing’ is a too strong word for ‘euthanasia’. 
Killing entails an image of murder where there is the role of a killer and its victim(s). 
Beauchamp and Childress highlight the ambiguity surrounding the term ‘killing’ in 
correlation to ‘letting die’. The authors write that although in ordinary language 
‘killing’ does not entail an “intentional action for killing”; “killing is any form of 
deprivation or destruction of life, including animal or plant life.” 4
There are “emotive connotations of moral wrongness”5 that accompanies ‘killing’. 
Beauchamp and Childress further write that killing:
represents a family of ideas whose central condition is direct causation of 
another’s death, whereas allowing to die represents another family of ideas whose 
central condition is intentional avoidance of causal intervention so that a disease 
or injury causes a natural death.6
The argument here is that although the result of ‘killing and letting die’ is the same, the 
intention is important. Firstly the connection between ‘killing’ and ‘euthanasia’ should 
be severed, for although it may be true that in ordinary language ‘killing’ encompasses a 
wide range of meanings including usage such as “killing a legislative bill”7, there is a
4 BEAUCHAMP, T. L. and CHILDRESS, J. F. Principles o f Biomedical Ethics. Fourth Edition. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994, page 220
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
65
serious moral stigma attached to the term ‘killing’. Euthanasia is not about ‘killing’ 
someone with malicious intent, but about relieving persons’ suffering and pain, with the 
aim of giving patients a dignified and painless death. To use a trivial everyday 
example, we do the same for horses that have broken their legs badly. The horse is in 
so much pain, with little chance of recovering to its former state, that most people out 
of love and compassion for the horse, shoot it. The killing of the horse here, like with 
terminally ill patients, is not done out of malicious intent but to relieve its suffering. 
The terminating of life, is done out of respect for the horse’s way of life, in the same 
way we value the life of a human being. However the example of the horse is not to be 
used to mean that their value of life is based on our perception of what a horse’s life 
should be about. In the same way, we should not use our individual ideas on what 
constitutes a life that is worth living, as a basis for conducting euthanasia on others.
Euthanasia is not killing, in the morally wrong sense, but more like allowing people to 
choose to die in the manner that they prefer. Therefore only voluntary euthanasia or 
physician assisted suicide, which incorporates the patient’s request, should be 
considered as euthanasia. For only then will the true meaning of a ‘good death’ be 
realised by patients and those around them.
Withholding and withdrawing of treatment, should not be under the category of 
euthanasia, because it is the illness that prevents the treatment from working. If a 
patient has a good chance of recovery, medical staff would prefer to try to resuscitate 
and aggressively employ treatment. But if there is a clear case of poor prognosis, 
treatment would not be a gain for the patient and would only result in a drain of already 
strained medical resources. Withdrawing and withholding treatment may not always 
bring about a dignified or ‘good death’ but it is letting ‘nature take its course’ when 
nothing more that would be of benefit to a patient can be given. Therefore, 
passive/involuntary, passive/non-voluntary euthanasia, withholding and withdrawing of 
treatment, have no direct relation to euthanasia. They are merely letting patients die, if 
they opt to reject treatment, or when medical staff see no benefit for them.
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3.1.3 Passive euthanasia
Passive euthanasia, as with the issues discussed before, should not be classified under 
euthanasia. The main reasoning for this is because passive euthanasia is Tetting nature 
take its course’ by disallowing medical intervention when the need arises. An example 
of this would be, patients that are dying from terminal cancer suffering from respiratory 
problems who express the wish not to be put on a ventilation machine when their 
breathing fails. Should the medical staff acquiesce to their patients’ wishes, they are in 
effect, allowing passive euthanasia. They do not have an active participation in causing 
the patients’ death in a way that a lethal injection may hasten death. At the same time, 
however, they are not using medical treatment that would enable the patients to live for 
some time. Therefore the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, is whether 
you hasten death through artificial means, or through omission of treatment which lets 
patients die naturally. Passive euthanasia is close to withholding and withdrawing of 
treatment as they let the patients die.
Voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia can be either active or passive. 
Once again, only active/voluntary euthanasia can be considered as euthanasia, and be 
made legally permissible. The reason being that this criterion is the only one that 
involves decisive decision making on the patients’ part. Passive/voluntary euthanasia is 
legally permissible already, in the sense that patients have the right to reject treatment. 
Patients cannot be given treatment against their wishes even if it may be of benefit for 
them. Thus passive euthanasia is similar to withholding and withdrawing treatment. 
Therefore, the argument will be in a similar line as the aforementioned in that, passive 
euthanasia is not euthanasia because it is letting a patient die through natural means. 
The underlying cause of death is not because treatment was withheld from them, but 
because of the illness. The patients with respiratory problems may suffer when dying 
even if treatment is withheld or withdrawn from them. Withholding or withdrawing of 
treatment is not killing the patients and neither is it providing a peaceful means of death 
at all times.
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So far a distinction between euthanasia and letting die has been discussed. There is a 
fine line, between actively bringing about death through injecting a lethal drug, and 
omitting to treat a patient. What is clear though, is that both do not have malicious 
intent, although death is the result. This is because the aim is to relieve the patients’ 
pain and sufferings. Euthanasia hastens death, through an active involvement of 
medicine, so that patients will die swiftly with minimum pain. Withholding and 
withdrawing of treatment is not euthanasia, because there is no active medical 
involvement, but a lack of it. Involuntary and non-voluntary are also not euthanasia 
because they do not involve active decision making on the patients’ part, and because 
the cause of death is not due to omission of treatment or through active euthanasia, but 
because of their illness. There is a ‘grey area’ between active/voluntary, 
active/involuntary and active/non-voluntary, but the method of bringing about death is 
similar. There is however a difference, in that only with active/voluntary is euthanasia 
requested. For the other two, euthanasia cannot be requested, or patients are not invited 
to. If active/involuntary or active/non-voluntary is allowed, it is only because the 
medical staff, family and medical ethics committee would see euthanasia through lethal 
injection as a more humane method in letting a person or a neonate die. This would be 
seen to be better than letting their condition deteriorate slowly and die under painful 
conditions. In this case, it is not the injection that causes the death but the illness. The 
lethal injection merely hastens death, only because the neonates or non-autonomous 
person was dying to begin with. In the case of an anencephalic neonate or an infant 
suffering from chronic skin disorder, they may survive for a few months or a few years 
but the burden of their existence may outweigh the benefits in living.
3.2 Withholding MN&H
There is an increasing debate on whether medically administered nutrition and 
hydration (herewith written as MN&H) can be used as a basis for letting a patient die. 
MN&H; using needles and tubes to administer nutrition and hydration, can be argued as
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being an obligatory medical treatment that sustains patients, whilst others may see it as 
being optional treatment at the same level as respirators.
There has been several cases where MN&H has been withheld from Down’s syndrome 
and severely handicapped neonates so that they would eventually die. The main 
question that must be addressed is, when is nutrition and hydration a treatment, and 
when is it a fundamental requirement as a means to survival. For people and infants 
that are not terminally ill, nutrition and hydration is a basic requirement for their well 
being. Without it people would die painfully from starvation. For terminally ill patients 
MN&H is not always a requirement if they are not benefiting from it, or request not to 
have it. Nutrition and hydration is a basic requirement, whether it is administered orally 
or through IV lines, only when the patient can benefit from it and require it. Otherwise, 
the withholding of MN&H does not necessarily mean pain and discomfort for 
terminally ill patients, or severely handicapped neonates. This is probably because their 
body has no requirement for usually essential nutrition and hydration.
In the case of Baby John Pearson, the neonate was prescribed ‘nursing care only’, which 
consisted of water as well as high dosages of pain killing drugs. Pain killing drugs are 
not part of MN&H, and the amount given to Baby John Pearson was at toxic level. The 
pain killers may not have been the result of the neonate’s death, but he may have 
weakened to the point that it naturally developed pneumonia, which brought about 
death as a result.
From this case we can deduce that, had hydration and nutrition been given in required 
amounts (the number of times the neonate was actually fed was not recorded), he may 
have had a fairly good chance at survival as a relatively healthy baby. The neonate’s 
abnormalities of the lung, heart and brain may however, have made him more 
susceptible to pneumonia. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the lack of 
MN&H did play a part in bringing about his death. This shows that nutrition and
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hydration was a benefit, and was a basic requirement to ensure his survival, and not a 
treatment. It was not withholding treatment or underlying cause of illness that caused 
the death, but withholding nutrition and hydration, along with the high level of pain 
killing drugs.
If on the other hand, a neonate was bom with severe handicap, such as anencephaly, 
then MN&H may be treatment because the neonate is dying from the time it is bom. 
Baby John Pearson was not dying from an abnormality. The illness developed as a 
result of having only hydration and pain killing drugs.
Beauchamp and Childress have written that the withholding or withdrawing of MN&H 
does not mean starvation in the same sense that a healthy person may perceive it to be8. 
It does not necessarily entail a painful death. This is probably true, but it would not be 
wrong to say that the patient does become weak from lack of nutrition and hydration, 
thus making the patient more susceptible to illness and infections. We would not for 
example, omit MN&H to patients with AIDS, for otherwise we would be hastening 
their death. Unless the patients are dying already and would not benefit from MN&H.
Omission of MN&H does not mean euthanasia for the patients, although at times it does 
cause an illness that results in death. Omission of MN&H is a ‘means to an end’ 
however, in the sense that the ‘end’ would be death, and the ‘means’ the omission of 
MN&H, it plays a large part in bringing about death. However, it is not euthanasia 
because firstly, it is not the direct cause of death, and secondly, it does not bring about a 
‘good death’ (which has inferences of painless and swift death).
If omission of MN&H is practiced on neonates like Baby John Pearson, it could be 
interpreted as murder, because death was the intention on the Down’s syndrome
8 BEAUCHAMP and CHILDRESS, ref. 4, page 205
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neonate that was not dying to begin with. Dr. Arthur was acquitted, but there are still 
doubts as to whether this was the right decision for the juries to arrive at. The one 
saving factor for Dr. Arthur is that he respected the parents’ wishes. There are 
undoubtedly many occasions where a physician would be inclined to follow the parents’ 
wishes, as it would be psychologically easier. The physicians’ empirical knowledge, 
concerning the life of Down’s syndrome with complications, may amplify this 
tendency. The infant if lucky, would be adopted but otherwise it would be sent to 
institutions, where it would live there for life. There are therefore, other social factors 
that influence physicians, families and society on what would be beneficial to a neonate 
with Down’s syndrome or severe handicap.
To summarise, MN&H can and should be withdrawn if a patient rejects it, or is clearly 
not benefiting from it. For then MN&H would mean treatment for a dying patient. If 
however, the patient would benefit from MN&H and would be able to lead a relatively 
healthy life without additional medical treatment, then MN&H is a basic requirement 
and not a treatment. Finally, MN&H is not euthanasia because it is not the direct cause 
of death. The underlying illness prevents MN&H to be positively utilised by the body.
3.3 Euthanasia for severely handicapped or ill neonates
When somebody is in obvious pain and discomfort it is natural for anyone to feel a 
sense of helplessness and longing to relieve their pain. This feeling is more acute for 
infants who are helpless to do anything that would make themselves feel better. If they 
are bom with a congenital handicap(s) or severe illness, medical staff can alleviate their 
pain to a certain degree. The methods they can employ are, however, short term and do 
not always guarantee permanent freedom from pain and discomfort. In cases where 
there is no cure for an illness or permanent treatment, medical staff and parents have to
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act as surrogate decision makers to decide what course of action would be of best 
interest for the infant.
Many infants, especially spina bifida neonates, were aggressively treated until the 
1970’s. Questions however arose on whether their quality of life was a benefit to them 
or a burden. There is a growing trend to see their lives as being a burden rather than a 
benefit for them. With today’s medical technology many severely handicapped and ill 
neonates can be rigorously treated. However, the number of operations and the 
difference between the time that they are free of pain compared to the time that they are 
in pain is great. So much so that medical institutions, families, medical ethicists, and 
the law have come to the point of having to decide whether aggressive treatment is 
really the best option for them.
We cannot make life or death judgements based on another’s quality of life. There are 
however cases where it is clear that a neonate would benefit from death rather than life. 
Anencephalic neonates for example, have a short life span, and do not benefit from life 
because they would never be able to enjoy anything that is offered to them in life. 
Spina bifida neonates, depending on the severity of their condition, may also be so 
mentally handicapped that they will not have any awareness of their environment or the 
love and affection given by others. Severely ill infants, such as those suffering from 
chronic skin disorder, will be in continuous pain unless they are given pain killers. But 
this again, will eventually lead to their death.
When infants’ lives are seen to be more of a burden than a benefit, by the medical staff 
and parents, the method of ending their lives has to be decided. The usual method, and 
the only legally acceptable method at this time, is through the withholding, withdrawing 
of treatment or MN&H (which would be considered as treatment if the infant is dying). 
With this method medical staff and parents will be letting the infants die naturally. This
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is passive non-voluntary, but not euthanasia, as the illness or handicap is the cause of 
death. Their lives are only sustained through medical treatment.
Death may be slow and painful by letting an infant die naturally. The medical staff will 
no doubt ensure that an infant in this unfortunate circumstance will be kept as 
comfortable as possible, but it may nevertheless be agonising for all parties involved, as 
they await the infant’s death. If this is the situation and the result is the same, would it 
not be morally more acceptable to permit active/non-voluntary euthanasia for infants? 
At least this way they will be ensured a swift and painless death. Perhaps it is more 
humane to allow a swift death for those that are dying slowly in pain. We allow, for 
example, a horse to die swiftly, why should we not allow the same for humans?
One of the main reasons that hold us back from accepting active/non-voluntary 
euthanasia, lies with the fact that the patients in this category are non-autonomous. 
They are unable to give their opinion on critical questions such as: whether they are in 
pain or not, if they wish to be allowed to die, or whether they prefer euthanasia. All 
decisions have to be made by surrogate decision makers, and this makes us feel 
skeptical about accepting active/non-voluntaiy euthanasia.
There seems to be a general fear of allowing others to have the authority to make life or 
death decisions about another’s life. We have seen that euthanasia can be abused. For 
example, the Nazi’s concept of euthanasia. We are afraid that the slippery slope 
scenario might occur again. There is little chance of another Nazi holocaust occurring, 
but that was genocide and not euthanasia to begin with. One of the main problems we 
face with accepting euthanasia is that the Nazi holocaust began with the concept of 
euthanasia. The term was quickly abused and used to commit genocide on the basis 
that they were making quality of life decisions for others:
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The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude 
of the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the 
euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. 
This attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the severely ill and 
chronically sick. Gradually the sphere of those to be included in this category was 
enlarged to encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the 
racially unwanted and finally all non-Germans. The infinitely small wedged-in- 
lever from which this entire trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude 
toward the nonrehabilitable sick.”9
The presence of doctors like Dr. Jack Kervorkian may also be a problem. The doctor’s 
intention is undoubtedly well meant, as his aim is to relieve people of their physical and 
psychological sufferings. This can be appreciated to a certain extent. However his 
clinical and psychological diagnosis of his patients seem to be unusually short. The 
doctor does not seem to be making a differentiation between patients that are 
psychologically depressed, and would benefit more from having psychiatric 
consultation rather than physician-assisted suicide, and patients that are really suffering 
from a severe illness or debilitating condition. The one saving factor for Dr. 
Kervorkian, is that all his patients have given their consent in writing and verbally, on 
video tapes. They have clearly indicated their request to be euthanised as mentally 
competent adults.
Non-autonomous persons cannot give their consent, thus active/non-voluntary 
euthanasia may be standing on a fine line between murder and providing a ‘good death’, 
for these people. One wrong step by a physician and he/she would be prosecuted for 
murder. Physicians may argue here that it need not necessarily have to be their 
responsibility to conduct euthanasia. Anyone can in effect do so, so long as they are 
autonomous adults. This is true, but there is a general belief that because doctors
9 BEAUCHAMP and CHILDRESS, ref. 4, page 231
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develop a close relationship between patients and their families, it would be easier for 
the families to accept active/non-voluntary euthanasia.
From the arguments raised above, it can be understood that active/non-voluntary 
euthanasia should not be legalised, simply because the groups of people that are 
included in this category are unable to express their opinion, and secondly, because 
their life or death decision is based on the quality of life as judged by others. It is clear, 
therefore, that active/non-voluntary is legally not permissible. There are doubts 
however as to whether the same applies morally.
Morally it is wrong to end another’s life, but it is also wrong to sustain a life that is full 
of pain. The former could be equivalent to murder and the latter to torture. Moral 
judgements, however, are based on the intention behind the act. If there is malicious 
intent involved in the act of killing, it is murder, but if the intention is good it is not 
murder but euthanasia or assisted suicide. The same goes for torture. Torture is 
morally wrong because the intention is to harm someone, on the other hand, if a 
treatment is painful but would result in net benefit for the patient then it is not morally 
wrong. The intention in this case is to cure the patients, not to harm them, therefore it 
is morally permissible. In the same way, if neonates are suffering from an incurable 
illness or severe handicap with no prospects of leading a life worth living, then it is 
morally permissible for their lives to be terminated. Neonates, in these unfortunate 
cases, would be freed from a life that has no prospects of enjoyment or appreciation of 
it. There is no need to continue a life that is so full of pain and suffering that the burden 
outweighs the benefits.
There will undoubtedly be difficulties in resolving the issue of why something that is 
morally permissible should not also be legally permissible. Perhaps the difference lies 
in the threat to the rest of the society. If active/non-voluntary euthanasia became legally 
permissible, who is to say that when we become non-autonomous or terminally ill, our
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lives would not be threatened? Our lives may also be judged as not worth living. The
legally permissible because of the threat to the rest of society.
3.4 Abortion or infanticide?
Abortion is legally and morally permissible, but infanticide is not. There does not 
however, seem to be a moral difference between abortion and infanticide, in that both 
result in the death of a potential person. The obvious difference between abortion and 
infanticide is that one is done before birth, and the other, after birth. Why should this 
distinction make infanticide so intolerable to society?
The definitions of abortion and infanticide in ‘The Concise Oxford Dictionary’ are as 
follows:
abortion - 1) the expulsion of a foetus from the womb before it is able to survive 
independently, 2) a stunted or deformed creature or thing.10
infanticide - 1) the killing of an infant soon after birth, 2) the practice of killing 
newborn infants, 3) a person who kills an infant.11
It is interesting to note that the second definition of abortion describes, in some ways, a 
severely handicapped neonate. There are negative connotations from the use of the 
word ‘creature’ as if there is something wrong with a life that is bom with 
abnormalities. This definition is however not important in our discussion. The first
10 The Concise Oxford Dictionary. Ninth Edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995, page 4
11 Ibid., page 695
chances of a slippery slope scenario occurring are slim; however, if there is political, 
economical or social instability euthanasia can be abused to terminate many lives. 
Therefore, although active/non-voluntary euthanasia is morally issible, it is not
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definition of the word abortion is, ‘before it is able to survive independently’. This is 
important in the context of severely handicapped or ill neonates as they do not have the 
capacity to survive independently. All infants and children need support from their 
family for basic survival, but the infants that we are concerned with, will never have the 
capacity to survive independently. If a infant’s prospects are such that it will never 
have the opportunity to have a life that is worth living, and will never have the chance 
to survive independently, then infanticide cannot be any worse morally than abortion. 
The only difference is that infanticide takes place after the birth.
As with many of the controversies concerning euthanasia, it is the perception that mar’s 
the truth. The term infanticide conjures up images of innocent healthy infants being 
killed through malicious intent. It is unfortunate that there are cases where healthy 
normal infants are killed for reasons that can only be seen as perverse. All infants 
should be cherished, loved and protected, but this could also mean that if their lives are 
full of pain and suffering without a chance of leading lives that are worth living, then 
love for them may sometimes have to be expressed in the form of allowing them to die.
It can even be argued that at times, infanticide for severely handicapped or ill infants is 
morally permissible, but abortion is not. This will be best highlighted by an example:
Ultrasonography is now commonly used during pregnancy to establish gestational 
age and to detect abnormalities. Mrs. Smith, age 23 and healthy, is 24 weeks 
pregnant with her first child. A sonogram reveals that the infant’s ventricles are 
large. What does the physician tell Mrs. Smith? ‘Your infant probably has 
hydrocephalus, water on the brain. We do not have enough experience to know if 
this will get worse or leave your infant with severe impairment, or leave your 
child normal or with only the need for a shunt at birth. Most infants with shunted 
hydrocephalus can do very well. A major determinant of your child’s outcome 
may be the cause of the hydrocephalus, are high. If the hydrocephalus is due to a 
small abnormality blocking the outflow of fluid, then, if the hydrocephalus does
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not become to severe, we can put in a shunt at birth, and your infant has a high 
probability of being normal. Some surgeons are placing shunts into the fetus in 
utero, but this experimental technique in no way assures a normal child. You 
have to decide soon, because now we could terminate the pregnancy. In a week 
or so this can no longer be done, and the infant will have to be carried to term.12
Mrs. Smith is placed in a very distressing and difficult position. The doctor has a moral 
obligation to recommend abortion in light of the situation surrounding the infant, but 
there is doubt as to whether the infant will benefit from being terminated so early in its 
life.
Freeman writes in his article I f  Euthanasia were Licit the following:
...physicians, together with parents, may elect to terminate a pregnancy to prevent
the birth of a catastrophically impaired infant - even without certainty that the
infant will be catastrophically impaired. They are willing to sacrifice a possibly
11normal infant to avoid the likelihood of a potential disaster.
By aborting a potentially handicapped infant they are not giving it, if normal or only 
slightly handicapped, a chance at life. Do we not have a moral obligation and duty to at 
least give infants, that are in doubtful situations like the example described above, a 
chance to be bom so that a better diagnosis on the infant’s condition can be made then? 
Since the result of both abortion and infanticide is the same, it should be permissible to 
allow the infant to be bom, then if the diagnosis is not good it can be allowed to die at 
the parents’ and medical staffs discretion. For the above case of hydrocephalus, the 
infant will not be able to live for long, since the underlying severe condition is the cause 
of death, and not the withholding of treatment.
12 FREEMAN, J. M. If euthanasia were licit could lives be saved? McMILLAN, R.C., ENGELHARDT, 
H. T. Jr., and SPICKER, S. F. (eds.) In Euthanasia and the Newborn. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1987, pages 160-161
13 FREEMAN, ref. 12, page 164
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Another point that needs to be raised is that infanticide, although not legally 
permissible, happens daily. Infants bom in drought stricken countries or countries in 
war often die. Are we not committing infanticide by not trying to help those that are 
bom there? Unfortunately not all infants that are bom in unstable political or 
environmental circumstances can be saved. Infants that are bom in these severe 
situations have a lesser chance of survival, but this cannot be blamed on any one, unless 
it is a war. The rest of the world is not committing infanticide by being unable to help 
them. This is because firstly, it would be physically impossible to help all them, and 
secondly, there is no malicious intent from the rest of the world to bring about these 
infants’ deaths.
Infanticide is morally wrong only when there is malicious intent involved. 
Withholding treatment when the infant will not benefit from it, including MN&H, is noti
infanticide because the intention is not to harm the infant, but to let the it die as 
painlessly as possible. The withholding of MN&H, as stated earlier, does not mean
pain or starvation in the sense that we understand it. Abortion, on the other hand may
!
mean harm and can be taken to mean active/non-voluntary euthanasia, because death is 
immediate and done through some medical intervention. Even worse, abortion of a 
healthy foetus can be interpreted by some life support groups as being the equivalent to 
murder! What is of issue here is at what stage life as a human begins. Some may hold 
that life begins at the point of conception, whilst others may believe that it starts at 
birth. However, this is not important for pointing out the distinction, since the result 
brought about by abortion and infanticide is the same. So long as abortion or 
infanticide is done for the best interests of the infant and with parental consent, it is 
morally permissible.
There are marginal cases where it would be difficult to decide between abortion or to 
carry the foetus full term. In the example of Mrs. Smith, it was clear that the infant may 
be bom with hydrocephalus. This may make it easier for the parents to allow the infant 
to die if the diagnosis is not good. On the other hand, there may be cases where a foetus
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may seem to have spina bifida, but the severity is not known. In the event that an infant 
is bom with spina bifida the physician can treat it by covering the area of the spinal cord 
that is protruding. If the infant is bom and found to have the capacity to live by itself 
without medical support after the treatment of the spine, but suffers from severe brain 
damage, the parents will have to live with the care taking of the infant for as long as it 
lives. The best course of action that would probably be recommended by doctors then, 
is to withhold treatment and MN&H, and let the infant die naturally. Another argument 
may be that the parents, at the point of rejecting abortion, had made the decision to keep 
the infant and take responsibility in the caring of it even at the risk of having financial 
and emotional burden as a result.
These marginal cases makes it difficult to decide what is the best interests for the 
infant. But by aborting the foetus, the foetus will not have a chance at life. At least by 
allowing infanticide the infant was given a chance. We have a moral obligation to give 
foetuses, that have the potential to lead a normal life, a chance at life but no one but the 
parents have the legal right to dictate whether their baby should be aborted or not. As 
for infanticide, it is morally and legally permissible to let an infant die, if the medical 
staff and parents find that the infant will not benefit from any type of treatment. 
Finally, the difference between abortion and infanticide may be similar to the 
distinction made between withholding and withdrawing of treatment, in the sense that 
abortion is the withholding of life, and infanticide is the withdrawing of life. They are 
both not morally or legally wrong.
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3.5 Summary
Euthanasia is a highly controversial subject, because it results in unnaturally induced 
death. There is also the confusion in terminology where the word ‘euthanasia’ has been 
used to define any act that ends life. This chapter has arrived at the conclusion that only 
active/voluntary euthanasia can be called euthanasia in the strictest sense of the term.
It has been argued in this chapter that both active/voluntary euthanasia and active/non­
voluntary euthanasia are morally permissible so long as the patients are terminally ill 
and no longer benefiting from any sort of treatment. However there are difficulties with 
active/involuntary and active/non-voluntary euthanasia as the patient has either not been 
invited to request euthanasia, or is incapable of doing so. Autonomous persons can 
naturally consult with their physicians and arrive at a decision that would be of benefit 
for them. This is not possible with non-autonomous persons. Surrogate decision 
makers, family members together with medical staff, have to make the decision on their 
behalf based on the benefit/burden factor. There is also the danger of having euthanasia 
abused. To avoid this, euthanasia for non-autonomous persons should not be legalised, 
although it is morally permissible.
Withholding of MN&H has generally been misunderstood to mean death by starvation. 
This is not always the case since patients that are terminally ill may not have any 
requirements for nutrition and hydration.
Traditionally, infanticide has not been accepted by society. This is due to the visual 
impact of seeing the baby and then terminating its life, in contrast to, ending its life 
before birth. There may be cases however, where infanticide is morally more 
acceptable than abortion, as it allows for the baby’s condition to be diagnosed before 
making the judgement of whether its life is worth living or not. Finally, if the decision
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to terminate a life is made, then it should be made on the benefit/burden factor for the 
patients whereby the burden of their existence outweighs the benefits.
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4 Future of severely handicapped neonates
During the early 1960’s there was a trend to treat as many spina bifida neonates as 
possible. Early treatment was seen as vital for spina bifida neonates to ensure that the 
neonate does not suffer from further irreparable nerve damage. For 12 years in 
Sheffield, neonates bom with spina bifida were actively treated, but this soon gave 
rise to questions concerning their quality of life. This led to selective treatment of 
severely handicapped neonates, whereby those with the best chances of leading a life 
worth living, would be treated.
Today we face ethical dilemmas quite different to those that were previously faced. 
In the past, philosophers and ethicists, debated on the quality of life for neonates bom 
with severe handicaps. Medical advancement has brought about a new challenge; 
pre-natal screening, genetic screening tests and gene therapy. In many ways, medical 
advancement has been positive in that it has given us more choices and chances for 
leading a life worth living. At the same time, however, the increasing numbers of 
choices; whether to undertake screening and whether to abort the foetus, has led to 
more decision making for the parents and medical staff. Socio-economic factors may 
also influence decision making. In countries where there are scarce medical 
resources abortion may be recommended compared to countries that have resources. 
Other problems that may arise from genetic testing are: confidentiality of reports and 
impact of results on couples. What needs to be reminded here is that what ever 
decisions are made, they should be based on the child’s best interest first and then 
others’.
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4.1 Extraordinary Preventions
One of the best methods for solving the problems, concerning severely handicapped 
neonates, is through prevention. For whatever life support groups may argue, it seems 
that prevention is better than having to terminate a life that has been judged as a life 
not worth living. Medical advancement has made it possible to detect handicaps 
through pre-natal diagnosis. Even then it may never be possible to have all children 
bom in a mentally and physically sound condition. It may also be that we do not want 
this, because it would seem morally wrong to have perfect babies only, even though 
all parents would like their child to be bom both mentally and physically healthy.
What handicapped children have done for society is to bring out its best side. The 
humane, benevolent and caring side of our otherwise impersonal society. Families, as 
well as society, have a responsibility to provide the best medical care, education, and 
opportunities towards a worthwhile life. Through prevention of severe handicaps, the 
infants would not only have lower mortality, but a better chance of leading a life 
worth living. The decrease of neonates bom with severe handicaps may also make it 
possible to allocate higher standards of care to each child.
Medical advancement has made it possible to prevent and treat many neonates bom 
with severe handicaps. Prevention is undertaken in the form of pre-natal screening. 
This can be done in the form of genetic screening or ultrasonography.
Ultrasonography for pregnant women is generally known to find the sex of the foetus, 
but more importantly it diagnoses the pregnancy, assesses the gestational age, and 
finds congenital abnormalities of the foetus. It is a widely used and accepted method 
of detecting foetal abnormalities. Many major structural deformities can be detected 
by ultrasound in the second trimester of pregnancy, at about 16-20 weeks of
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gestation.1 When an abnormality is detected, the parents can opt to have further tests 
carried out through amniocentesis.
The main aim of the first screening test is to determine the protein a-fetoprotein in 
the maternal serum. This is because foetuses with neural tube defects , spina bifida or 
anencephaly for example, secrete an excess of the a-fetoprotein into the amniotic 
fluid. 80-90% of neural tube defective foetuses can be detected in this way. However 
most medical staff would use this as a basis for recommending further testing using 
amniocentesis. It has also been found that a low maternal concentration of a- 
fetoprotein is related to the occurrences of Down’s syndrome in foetuses. Combined 
with other environmental factors such as age of the mother and family history, 
medical staff are likely to recommend further testing through amniocentesis and 
chorionic villus sampling2 depending on the condition of the mother and her 
environmental factors.
Amniocentesis is the most widely used technique of prenatal diagnosis and is usually 
carried out at 15-18 weeks of gestation. The procedure consists of firstly using 
ultrasound to locate the placenta. A small quantity of amniotic fluid, which contains 
cells shed by the developing foetus, is withdrawn through a needle from the amniotic 
cavity. Before chromosome examination, to detect Down’s syndrome or DNA 
analysis can take place, the cells have to be cultured. There is a low risk to the 
pregnancy and neonate, although exact figures are not known yet. It has been found 
so far, that there is a 0.5%-l% risk of spontaneous abortion occurring following 
amniocentesis, as well as higher incidences of mild respiratory problems in neonates.
1 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. Genetic Screening - Ethical Issues. June 1996, page 115
2 See, MASON, J. K. and McCALL SMITH R. A. Law and Medical Ethics. London: Butterworths, 
1994, page 130
3 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ref. 1
85
There are several other types of prenatal testing. The following table represents the 
types of screening tests available to detect abnormalities in the foetus. Some tests can 
be done pre-pregnancy in order to ensure that couples are not carriers of a genetic 
abnormality.
Table 4.1: Current Genetic Screening Programmes in the UK (Sept. 1993)4
Age group Disease Population
screened
Type of 
screening test
Confirmation
required
Other
comments
Pre-marital 
and pre­
pregnancy
Cystic fibrosis Pilot projects 
in general 
practice
Direct No Detects 85-90% 
of carriers
During
pregnancy
Rhesus
haemolytic
disease
All mothers Indirect
Diabetes
mellitus
All mothers Indirect Foetuses have 
expert foetal 
anomaly scan­
ning
Congenital
malformations
Most foetuses Routine
ultrasound
Yes
fetal anomaly 
ultrasound
Down’s
syndrome
Neural tube 
defects (spina 
bifida and 
anencephaly)
1) All mothers 
in some areas
2) All mothers 
over 35-37
All mothers in 
many areas
Serum
screening tests
Chromosome 
tests on foetus
Indirect
Amniocentesis 
with chromos­
ome tests on 
fetus required 
for confirmati­
on 
No
Haemoglobin
disorders
All mothers 
not of North
Indirect Fetal anomaly 
ultrasound
Detects carriers
4 Adapted partially from Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ref. 1, page 27. Please refer to appendices for 
descriptions on the disease and the screening tests involved.
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European
origin
Cystic fibrosis Pilot studies Direct No Detects 85-90%  
o f  carriers
(Table continues from previous page)
The above testings are widely practiced today, and are the basis for conducting further 
genetic testing when necessary. Information in the form of leaflets are given out in 
the UK to inform expecting mothers on screening for spina bifida and Down’s 
syndrome. Set below is the content of the information leaflet produced by ‘West of 
Scotland Prenatal Screening Service’, to give an example of the type of information 
available, for expecting mothers or couples planning pregnancies. Information is 
given in a question and answer format3.
Table 4.2: The Screening for Spina Bifida and Down’s Syndrome 
(Table continues for 3 pages)
A: Happily most babies are healthy. A small number however are bom each year with 
abnormalities such as spina bifida and Down’s syndrome. Couples may choose to 
have a test during pregnancy which may help to detect one of these rare 
abnormalities.
----------------- ---------------
A: Spina bifida and anencephaly are the two main types of abnormality together 
known as neural tube defects. About 1 in every 500 births is affected. Babies with 
spina bifida have an opening in the bones of the spine, and the nerves to the lower 
part of the body are damaged. This can result in difficulties in walking and bowel and 
bladder control. Sometimes there is also a learning disability (mental handicap).
In babies with anencephaly the skull and brain are not properly formed. These babies 
generally die before or very soon after they are bom.
Q: What is
A: People with Down’s syndrome (Sometimes referred to as trisomy 21) have an extra 
chromosome, having three copies of chromosome 21 instead of two. Chromosomes 
carry genes which pass certain characteristics from parents to their children.
5 Reprinted from leaflet produced by, West o f  Scotland Prenatal Screening Service. Glasgow: Duncan 
Guthrie Institute o f  Medical Genetics, Feb. 1996
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Abnormalities can occur when there are too many chromosomes. Children with 
Down s syndrome will have a learning disability and may have other abnormalities 
such as heart defects. Older mothers are more likely to have a baby with Down’s 
syndrome. For example Down’s syndrome occurs once in every 1500 births to 
women aged 20 years whereas at age 40 the rate is increased to 1 in 100 births.
should have the screening test?
A: Women choose whether or not to have the screening test, it is a personal choice 
for you and your partner to make. All pregnant women irrespective of age can have 
the test. There is no charge for this test.
q  g — ■—t— — ^9-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A: There are two stages to testing. The first stage is a screening test and depending 
on the results of this test some women (about 1 in 10) will be offered a second follow 
up test.
For the screening test, a small blood sample is taken from your arm at around 15-16 
weeks of pregnancy and sent to the laboratory. There, the levels of two naturally 
occurring pregnancy hormones called AFP and HCG are measured. Within two 
weeks of having the screening test you should receive a letter telling you the results, - 
whether you are a low risk or higher risk for spina bifida or Down’s syndrome.
If the screening test is ‘low risk’ there is only a very small chance that your baby will 
have spina bifida or Down’s syndrome and no further test is indicated. 9 out of 10 
women will be low risk.
A: No. The screening test can identify about 4 out of 5 spina bifida pregnancies and 
bout 2 out of 3 Down’s syndrome pregnancies . Occasionally, other rarer 
abnormalities are picked up by the screening test.
A: If the screening results are ‘high risk’, this indicates that there is an increased 
chance that the baby has either a neural tube defect of Down’s syndrome (it is very 
unlikely that the pregnancy will be at increased risk for both types of abnormality) 
and that further investigation will be offered. You will be asked to return to the 
hospital where the results will be discussed with you, your questions answered and the 
type of follow-up tests explained.
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This screening result means that the AFP level was high and that there is some 
increase in the risk of spina bifida. About 1 woman in 20 will have this result but this 
does not mean for certain that there is an abnormality and most women with these 
results will have normal healthy babies. The most common causes of a high AFP 
result are:
The pregnancy was further along than was thought. 
There are twins.
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• Normal variations in the level o f  AFP in the blood.
A follow-up test, usually a detailed ultrasound scan, is offered to show whether an 
abnormality is present or not.
This screening result means that the combination of AFP and HCG results together 
with a woman’s age show a higher risk of Down’s syndrome. About 1 in 20 women 
will have this type of screening result. This result does not mean for certain that there 
is an abnormality and most women with these results will have normal healthy 
babies. The most common cause of this type of screening result are:
• The pregnancy is not as far along as thought.
• Normal variations in the level of AFP and HCG in the blood.
Follow-up tests, such as amniocentesis or CVS are offered to show whether the baby 
has Down’s syndrome.
lilllllililiSililllilill
A: These tests are used where the screening test result indicates that further 
investigation of the pregnancy should be considered. They include:
Ultrasound (also known as ‘Scanning’): Almost all women have a routine ultrasound 
scan at some stage in their pregnancy. Sound waves are used to make a picture off 
the baby on a special TV screen. It can show the age and position of the baby and 
also if there are twins. It can also detect certain abnormalities such as spina bifida but 
at present cannot detect Down’s syndrome. There is no known risk to the baby from 
ultrasound.
Amniocentesis. This follow-up test is used where the screening result shows an 
increased risk of Down’s syndrome. For most women amniocentesis takes only a few 
minutes and causes little discomfort. First, ultrasound is used to find a safe place in 
the womb and then a needle is inserted through the abdominal wall into the fluid 
(called amniotic fluid) surrounding the baby. A small amount of fluid is removed and 
sent to the laboratory where it is used to examine the baby’s chromosomes. The 
result of the amniocentesis test takes around 3 weeks, and will tell whether the baby 
has Down’s syndrome or normal chromosomes. There is a 1 in 100 chance of 
miscarriage following amniocentesis.
CVS (Chorionic villus sampling): This follow-up test is offered in some hospitals 
instead of amniocentesis and is carried out in a similar way. A needle is used to 
remove some cells from the placenta, which are then sent to the laboratory where the 
baby’s chromosomes are examined. The result of the CVS test takes around 2 weeks 
and will tell whether the baby has Down’s syndrome or normal chromosomes. There 
is a 1 in 100 chance of miscarriage following CVS at this stage in pregnancy.
A: In most cases follow-up testing finds a healthy baby. If spina bifida or Down’s 
syndrome is found this will be discussed fully with you and your partner and you will
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be able to choose what you feel is best for you and your partner. Some couples will 
decide to continue with the pregnancy while others feel that termination of the 
pregnancy is their preferred choice. There is no pressure from hospital staff to 
influence you in your decision, only help and support.
From the content it can be seen that the leaflet provided by the West of Scotland 
Prenatal Screening Service is informative. General aims and methods are described 
so that there is as little surprise as possible for the expecting mothers when they ask 
for the test. The language use is gentle with the focus on the needs of the mother. 
The words ‘choice’ and ‘choose’ are repeated often, emphasising that the ultimate 
decision making rests with the expecting mother and her partner whatever the result 
may be. It is interesting to note the last sentence of the leaflet: “There is no pressure 
from hospital staff to influence you in your decision, only help and support.” This 
stresses that the decision will ultimately lie with the mother, in that no one can force 
her to have an abortion. It is, however, known that medical staffs advice and 
suggestions will play a large part in the decision making.
4.2 Ordinary Preventions
Not all preventions need to be complex and concerned with medical tests. Ordinary 
prevention of handicapped neonates can be achieved through having a nutritional diet 
and taking supplements to compliment the needs of pregnancy. Dietary supplements 
based on the needs of pregnant women are readily available. Folic acid has been 
recommended for preventing neural tube defects in foetuses, and is being publicised 
through advertisements and information in magazines for women.
It has been recommended that all women capable of becoming pregnant should 
consume 0.4mg of folic acid daily to prevent neural tube defects in foetuses later on. 
On the other hand, it is important that physicians and women understand that
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women’s consumption should not exceed the recommended daily allowance. Too 
much vitamin A by pregnant women may cause birth defects. It is found to be 
beneficial for pregnant women to consume supplements limited to a single multi­
vitamin preparation containing folic acid and no more than the recommended daily 
allowance of 8000IU of Vitamin A6.
4.3 Ethical and Technical Problems
Amniocentesis is the most popular method of detecting abnormalities in the UK with 
more than 1% of mothers undergoing the test7. There are however a number of 
practical problems. Firstly, the number of centres practicing amniocentesis is limited. 
At present, it is not seen to be feasible to offer everyone amniocentesis as there would 
be little or no benefit in terms of positive results. There would also be a strain on 
man power resources in operating amniocentesis everywhere. In order to make the 
system more feasible, amniocentesis should only be offered to mothers with problems 
detected at the first screening test; consisting only of a blood test, those that have 
already had a neural tube defect, have a family history of neural tube defect, or 
chromosomal abnormality, and mothers over the age of 358.
The readily available information on screening tests, in the form of leaflets, informs 
us that screening for congenital defects in foetuses are recommended and are widely 
implemented in the UK. This is a positive indication that the public is made aware of 
the possible complications for expecting mothers. The medical profession with the 
cooperation of the government is trying to aim for less severely handicapped neonates 
and more healthy, normal babies. This would also be a benefit for the government in
6 OAKLEY, G. P. Jr. and ERICKSON, D. J. Vitamin and Birth Defects - Continuing Caution Is 
Needed. The New England Journal o f Medicine, Nov. 23, 1995, Vol. 333, No. 21, page 1414
7 MASON and McCALL SMITH, ref. 2, page 131
8 Ibid.
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that medical resources allocated for neonatal care and social services for severely 
handicapped and handicapped children, would be cut down so that each child would 
get better attention that is catered to individual needs.
The main ethical problem that arises from amniocentesis is through the duration it 
takes for the result to be available. Even with the best medical or technical staff, an 
adequate amount of fluid can only be taken after the 14th week of pregnancy. In 5- 
10% of cases, adequate fluid is not obtained and the test has to be repeated. 
Considering the time factor, of taking three weeks until results are obtained, the 
foetus would have developed to a gestational age that is close to a viable infant. This 
will result in a more complicated and dangerous operation for the mother in the event 
that termination of pregnancy is chosen.
The main medical concern involving testing in chorionic villus sampling is that it has 
a high risk of miscarriage compared to other tests. Early sampling may also result in 
facial or limb abnormalities in an otherwise normal foetus. Therefore chorionic villus 
sampling should be limited to those that are at greatest risk, who are likely to seek 
termination of the foetus, or for cases where there is a single gene defect that requires 
diagnosis.
Screening has been proved to be a powerful medical tool, in detecting congenital 
defects, to avoid further development of a foetus that will most likely not be able to 
lead a life that is worth living. This is naturally difficult to judge, through foetal 
diagnosis, and there are clear limitations to screening and tests. There are also, 
inevitably, some false positive and false negative results which will increase with the 
complexity of the tests required. One way of preventing these problems is to obtain 
information on underlying environmental causes in multifactorial diseases. 
Multifactorial diseases are disorders that result from both environmental factors and
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from one or several genes. Neural tube defects are the most important multifactorial 
diseases.
Although modem gene marking techniques have reduced the number of severely 
handicapped neonates, there are still more tests that need to be developed. Normal 
male children at risk of x-linked disease, for example, are still legally aborted9. 
Screening and tests that indicate the level of raised a-fetoprotein level are unable to 
clearly show the degree of neural tube defects. In the same way, the low maternal 
concentration of a-fetoprotein, will not be an indication of the severity of Down’s 
syndrome. This means that routine testing with positive results will result in abortion 
of foetuses that may be treatable after their birth, or will be able to lead a life worth 
living even with some degree of handicap. There is also the problem of neonates that 
are bom through false negative results. 10-20% of the neonates will be bom with 
severe handicaps that will require extensive treatment10.
Testing of gene abnormalities could be considered as a flood gate to ethical problems. 
It is for example, possible to detect chromosomal abnormalities through genetic 
screening tests. Most of these abnormalities are related to severe diseases, but some 
are also related to behavioural patterns. According to chromosomal testing, XXY 
boys, for example, are prone to vicious behaviour. There are also others that are 
related to infertility or mental dysfunction. Even if there would never be the 
likelihood of foetuses with chromosomal abnormalities, related to disagreeable 
behavioural patterns being aborted, there is the question of whether medical staff 
should recommend abortion of all foetuses with abnormalities related to handicaps or 
severe diseases as a precaution. Should doctors, on the other hand, inform the parents 
of the risks and let the pregnancy run through naturally? The parents will have to face 
the rest of the pregnancy with anxiety, and in the event the baby is bom with severe 
handicaps, they will have to face the difficult decision of whether to treat the baby or
9 MASON and McCALL SMITH, ref. 2, page 132
10Ibid.
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allow it to die. Difficulties also arise with foetuses detected to have Down’s 
syndrome. It would be difficult to determine the severity of the handicap, thus 
making the decision of whether to abort the foetus or not a highly complex and 
emotionally stressful situation for both the medical staff and parents. The decision 
making should however rest with the parents as they may have specific beliefs on the 
quality of life. Some parents may not be able to accept any level of abnormality, even 
if it is treatable. Whilst others may prefer to give their child a chance at life, even if 
the severity is found to be great. Medical staff should advice parents on the likely 
condition of the infant when bom and the types of treatment available.
There is also the question of ‘slippery slope’. Once we start aborting foetuses 
because of their congenital defects that are not accurately measurable, there may be 
the risk of increasing the boundaries for foetuses that can be legally aborted, such as 
XXY boys and those with mental dysfunctional chromosomes.
Information to expecting mothers, and couples planning pregnancies, should be as 
detailed as possible. Leaflet alone cannot cover all the difficult and complicated 
medical and ethical issues involved. The main consultation will lie with the medical 
staff. The expecting mothers should be made aware of the nature of the testing, and 
what the result may indicate, especially if the result shows information that are related 
to late onset diseases, such as Huntington’s disease, or mental illnesses such as 
Alzheimer’s. These are not severe handicaps in the sense that they affect the quality 
of life from birth, but will end up causing much distress to the individual and its 
family later on in life.
Screening tests for cystic fibrosis raise ethical issues that become involved at a 
personal level. In a study done on 2207 women in Edinburgh, 85% accepted whilst 
325 (15%) declined. Half of those that declined did so because they objected to 
termination of pregnancy. During the tests it was found that carriers showed high
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anxiety levels and depression whilst awaiting for their partners’ results. The tests 
were only conducted on partners if the pregnant woman was found to be a carrier. 
The level of anxiety and depression will naturally be significantly lowered if the tests 
on both partners are done simultaneously11.
Positive results for both partners from this test, can effect their relationship towards 
one another, and affect any future decisions to have children. This type of test can be 
done before marriage and pregnancies, but as with any sort of genetic testing, there is 
the ethical question of how much information people should have on the genetic 
condition of their bodies. Their future will be affected by positive results as a 
consequence of taking genetic tests, and will also result in becoming part of their 
‘family history’, which in return will affect future generations. Medical staff may feel 
that they have an obligation to advise other family members, including relatives of 
those with serious genetic disorders which may run in the family. The carrier on the 
other hand may prefer the information to remain confidential. There is a complex 
dilemma here for the medical staff and carriers. External factors of the family, such 
as family unity may have an effect on whether the carrier would want the information 
divulged or not. Therefore, medical staff should maintain their obligation to the 
carrier and not inform other members, however serious the genetic disorder may be. 
The information must be given from the carriers themselves to others. There is a 
delicate balance of trust between the medical staff and the patients. Once the trust of 
keeping information confidential is lost, there might be increasing hesitancy in taking 
genetic screening tests at all.
If treatment for specific genetic disorders are not found yet, it is difficult to assess 
whether the carriers should be informed of their genetic disorder. Their future plans 
may be somewhat marred by having this information. To illustrate, by having genetic 
testing for cancer during your mid-twenties, and finding the result to be positive, it 
may affect future plans of having a family. Some individuals that come from a family
11 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ref. 1, page 24
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with high instances of cancer related illnesses may feel that they prefer to know so 
that they can plan their future accordingly. Others may feel that ‘ignorance is bliss’ 
and prefer not to know. The decision of whether to take any sort of genetic screening 
tests should be left to the discretion of the individual. Education may be necessary 
here, to inform society of the positive and negative impacts of having genetic 
screening. Once tests confirm positive for a certain genetic disorder, there is a danger 
of increasing anxiety and severe depression, which may lead to suicide and other 
unhealthy social and psychological implications. Genetic screening test counsellors 
have the duty to inform individuals of the possible implications in having positive 
results. This should be done in a similar way as getting AIDS testing, so that the 
individual would be informed of the potential risks involved in undertaking such tests 
and what implications it may have on insurance, and employment. Although, legally 
it should be made implicit that information be kept highly confidential at all levels. 
Perhaps testing could be made in such a way as to remain as anonymous as possible 
so that the individuals would not have to give any information about themselves. This 
way, the information can remain confidential without having serious set backs for 
those taking the tests. Once the tests reveal results that indicate cancer genes, for 
example, it is up to the individuals on whether they inform their partners, and family 
members of the result. Consultants, at this point should advice on the best course of 
action, and recommend that others know the result, so that other family members can 
also have the opportunity to have the tests.
As genetic screening tests become more wide spread, society may gradually put 
emphasis on having genetic screening tests. Genetic screening tests are positive in 
that they can prevent the disease from developing through early prevention 
treatments. At the same time however, if there is no treatment, people with genetic 
disorders will have to bear the burden of knowing about their potential future at a 
very early age. Confidentiality is crucial so that social pressure will not interfere with 
the persons’ decision on their lives. To illustrate, a couple may find that one of them 
has tested positive for a cancer gene. Without education and confidentiality, society 
may begin to stigmatise couples that decide to have children despite the results.
96
Although genetic screening tests have many positive aspects; such as in preventing 
unnecessary births of infants with severe handicaps who would not have the potential 
of leading a life worth living, there is an equal number of negative aspects. There is 
an increasing number of tests that are being introduced. The option of whether to 
take the tests should be left to the individuals, but recommended only for those that 
have higher chance of having the genetic disorder. Family history, for example, could 
be used as an indication for recommending tests. Here again though confidentiality is 
important. Family practitioners, or gynaecologists can recommend couples planning 
pregnancies and individuals to take tests, and refer them to genetic screening test 
sites. Counsellors can then advice them of the pros and cons of taking the test(s). 
The information to be given by the individuals should be limited, to perhaps the 
family history only, so that counsellors can advice whether tests are necessary or not.
Parents, depending on the doctors that they consult with, may generally tend to seek 
the doctors’ advice and go along with their recommendation. Social pressure, where 
healthy, normal children are seen as the norm, may add pressure to the expecting 
mother and her partner to terminate the pregnancy in the event that the result of the 
tests indicate abnormalities in the foetus. Socially and morally birth should be 
recommended and supported compared to abortion, but with strained medical 
resources, recommendations may be made in favour of terminating the pregnancy. 
Society is also becoming increasingly demanding on the performance level of 
children, and the ‘perfect baby’ may be encouraged and wanted by parents if they 
were going to have children at all. Families are also becoming nuclear, hence parents 
may want to have as perfect babies as possible so that the best opportunities of life 
can be given to them. There is a multitude of reasons that may make termination of 
pregnancy more easier after an abnormality is detected. As was stressed in the leaflet 
though, the ultimate decision making has to be made by the expecting mother and her 
partner, with as little outside influence as possible.
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4.4 Gene Therapy
It seems that we have come around full circle concerning our relationship with 
severely handicapped neonates. In ancient times and till quite recently, handicapped 
neonates were killed or allowed to die, as they were not seen as economically viable. 
The same still occurs in developing countries as there are not enough resources to 
maintain severely handicapped neonates. The developed countries have the resources 
and technology to encourage the survival of neonates and treat them, but we have 
reached a point where it has become uneconomical, and also morally wrong to sustain 
a life that is not worth living. So now we have the technology for selective treatment 
after the birth of the child, but also before, through foetal diagnosis. Hence in this 
case, the quality of life judgements are made before birth using medical tests that 
cannot yet clearly define the severity of the disease or handicap. This poses ethical 
questions on whether we may be acting a little rashly in aborting foetuses that have 
been ‘detected’ as having some abnormalities. If there is genetic testing, then there 
should also be some level of therapy or engineering that can be used to treat the fault, 
so that the number of needless abortions can be lowered in the event that 
abnormalities are detected.
Gene therapy is relatively new in that it has only been in existence for less than a 
decade. It is the newest form of treatment for rare inherited diseases and common 
acquired disorders, including cancer, heart disease and the acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome. Gene therapy will be the main influence for future 
medical practice.
There are two types of gene therapy, somatic and germ-line. Both gene therapies are 
still in the experimental stage as there is little evidence of the clinical efficacy of the 
them. Yet considerable ethical and emotional debates have been raised The main 
concern for gene therapy is that there is genetic manipulation involved. This raises
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fears for future populations, and gives us visions of having genetically engineered 
children.
Somatic gene therapy is used in treating a disease within the patient and involves the 
insertion of genetic material which will replace the genetic material that has failed to 
operate its function. Germ-line therapy has two ways of functioning. One way is 
through the insertion of genetic material into the pre-embryo. The aim of this method 
is to treat the embryo and their future offspring. The second way is to insert the gene 
into the germ cells of the individuals. The function of this second method has no 
direct influence on the individuals themselves but it will ensure that their subsequent 
children will be bom with or without certain characteristics12.
Both therapies will be effective in eliminating severe and not so severe handicaps, 
and would ensure that all children are bom normal and healthy. It may be possible to 
use somatic gene therapy for severely handicapped neonates, and germ-line therapy 
for foetuses with abnormalities. This may, in the future, make it possible for all 
neonates that are bom with handicaps to be treated. This is revolutionary in that in 
the future there would not be any need for neonatal intensive care, but only embryonic 
care, or pre-pregnancy care for couples that are found to have genetic abnormalities 
that could be transmitted to their children.
In 1992, the ethical implications of somatic gene therapy, was analysed by the 
Committee on the Ethics of Gene Therapy (the Clothier Committee). Contrary to the
fears expressed in general, the committee did not find gene therapy as being
11controversial, and ‘felt that it gave rise to no new ethical challenges’ . Mason and 
McCall Smith agree that the aims of gene therapy are no different to other forms of 
treatment, ‘provided that they do not involve undue risk to the patient or to others’
12 MASON and McCALL SMITH, ref. 2, page 145
13 Ibid.
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and that it is ‘ethically as acceptable as is drug therapy or surgical intervention.’14 
Even if somatic gene therapy was used to treat behavioural disorders, ethical 
considerations will be similar to those that were raised concerning the use of 
psychotic drugs or psychosurgery.
Somatic gene therapy also has a positive aspect in that it uses the synthetic machinery 
of the patient’s cells to produce therapeutic agents. Since the body will be used in 
curing its own disease, there will be no need to manufacture highly purified proteins, 
and repeatedly administer proteins or drugs to the patients15.
There are more risks and ethical controversy with germ-line therapy as it has the 
potential of manipulating future generations. The main line of argument in favour of 
using germ-line therapy is that it would be effective in both eliminating and treating 
serious genetic disorders from being transmitted on to future generations. This idea 
of elimination of disease within humans has always been striven for and has been 
achieved through other forms of treatments and preventive medications. They all 
have influence on the natural order of thing. Firstly, if we find that eradication of 
diseases is unethical, we would never have the capacity to live as long as we do today, 
and secondly, medicine would or should never have existed then! It is natural that we 
want to find treatments for our ailments.
The main problem with allowing gene therapy lies with the ‘slippery slope’. If we 
allow germ-line therapy to eliminate serious diseases, then where would the limit be 
placed to prevent the elimination of undesirable genes, such as those that are linked to 
behavioural characteristics? This problem is clearly outlined in the following 
quotation from Rifkin in ‘Algeny
14 MASON and McCALL SMITH, ref. 2, page 145
15 BLAU, H. M. and SPRINGER M. L. Molecular Medicine; Gene Therapy - A novel form of drug 
delivery. The New England Journal o f Medicine, Nov. 2, 1995, Vol. 333, No. 18, page 1204
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Once we decide to begin the process of human genetic engineering, there is 
really no logical place to stop. If diabetes, sickle cell anaemia, and cancer are 
to be cured by altering the genetic make-up of an individual, why not proceed to 
other ‘disorders’: myopia, colour-blindness, left-handedness? Indeed, what is to 
preclude a society from deciding that a certain skin colour is a disorder?16
The fear of having eugenics interfering with gene therapy is indeed frightening. By 
creating therapy that uses genetic manipulation we also end up having to face other 
socially harmful consequences. The double effect of this treatment has to be 
seriously considered so that only benefit can come out of this new and extraordinary 
means of therapy. The Council of Europe, for example, recognised the dangers and 
had subsequently formulated that germ cell manipulation should only be used for 
therapeutic purposes.17 In Germany, the total outlawing of germ-line therapy was 
recommended and this was endorsed in a statement from the medical research 
councils of eleven European states in 198818. There is clearly a need for international 
policy making, in order to prevent genetic manipulation of future persons, for 
political or social motives.
The aim of gene therapy should be achieved and recognised as a new form of 
treatment because of its many positive aspects. Diseases that have been haunting us 
for generations would finally be eradicated, meaning that there would be less need for 
painful medical interventions in the future. This would also mean that everyone 
would have access to the same level of health. There is nothing wrong in this as 
everyone should have access to a healthy life. The danger of having genetically 
manipulated people in terms of behaviour or colour of the skin, can be and should 
strongly be prevented, in order to ensure that people’s individuality can be preserved 
as much as possible. Therefore a clear policy should be drawn in order to ensure that 
gene therapy is only used for therapeutic purposes.
16 RIFKIN, J. Algeny (1983) as quoted by MASON and McCALL SMITH in ref. 2, Page 146
17 Council of Europe Recommendation 1100 on the Use o f Human Embryos and Foetuses in Scientific 
Research (1989), ass cited by MASON and McCALL SMITH, in ref. 2, page 146
18 DE WACHTER, M. A. M. Ethical Aspects of Human Germ-line Gene Therapy. 7 Bioethics, 166, 
1993, as cited by MASON and McCALL SMITH, in ref. 2, page 146
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At the same time the policy should stress that the right to choose over having gene 
therapy should be left to the individuals. No individual should be forced into having 
gene therapy. This may however, become increasingly difficult as social pressure 
increases to have only ‘normal and healthy’ children or worse ‘perfect’ children. 
There is a trend towards only having normal and healthy children already, but this is 
no different from ancient times when handicapped neonates were killed at birth 
because they were not socially acceptable or not economically viable. Despite this 
trend people should maintain their right of having a choice, so long as they can take 
responsibility in the caring of their children, even if they are bom with severe 
handicaps. There is also always the option of the children, as they mature, making 
their own decisions concerning gene therapy, even if the parents did not want it.
Genetic screening has been shown to be the first step in limiting the number of 
neonates bom with severe handicaps or severe diseases. The positive aspect to this, is 
that the infant and the families will not be exposed to undue stress and pain, because 
of the unfortunate circumstances that the child was bom under. There would 
naturally be stress and emotional difficulties, for the couple that has decided to abort 
their foetus, however the best interests of the child has to be considered first All 
children should have the right to a normal and healthy existence so that they can lead 
a worthwhile life.
The difficulty lies with Down’s syndrome children, as they have the capacity for 
leading a life that is worth leading despite its handicaps, because they are endowed 
with almost all the values as a person including the added quality of having an 
extremely loving and caring nature. The only way to deal with this problem, is to 
allow the parents to make the decision of whether to abort a foetus or not, as they 
have the main responsibility of caring for their child.
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4.5 Summary
The negative aspect of present technology in screening is that there is not enough 
information that would indicate the level of abnormality in a foetus. This presents 
problems of possibly aborting foetuses that would have had the capacity to lead a life 
worth living. Worse, the information may be false, due to technical errors in the 
analysis of the screening tests, and the foetuses may have been normal. These 
mistakes are unfortunately unavoidable at the moment. We can only hope that the 
technology of screening tests would quickly improve to the level that would assess the 
degree of abnormality, so that undue abortions can be prevented.
Gene therapy is a revolutionary treatment that would change and influence future 
medical treatments. The aims of gene therapy are positive in that it seeks to eradicate 
common acquired disorders as well as rare inherited diseases, which would in return 
ensure a healthier population in the future. This form of therapy may also have the 
possibility of treating severely handicapped neonates, or to treat the abnormality at 
the pre-embryonic stage, so that unnecessary termination of pregnancies would be 
avoided.
The main concern, that cannot be stressed enough, is the interference of eugenic 
motivations that would abuse gene therapy and use it for genetic manipulation in 
order to change the natural condition of human beings. This may lead to lack of 
individuality, the eradication of race, colour and behavioural patterns that represent 
individual characteristics. The only way to prevent abuse of this otherwise positive 
form of medical therapy is to formulate a strict international policy to ensure that 
gene therapy would not be misused for genetic manipulation in future populations. 
Since the risks are high it would be wiser not to develop gene therapy any further, 
however positive this line of treatment may be, if a demarcation line cannot be held.
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Conclusion
Severely handicapped neonates, have been discussed here as having a value of life, as 
long as they are able to appreciate and enjoy life within their means. Our role, as 
autonomous persons, is to try to fulfil their aims and appreciate whatever value they 
have as a potential person. They may never be able to fulfil all the values required as a 
person, but so long as they are able to recognise love and affection, and derive pleasure 
from living, it would seem that they have at least the basic values as a person.
When the severity of the neonates’ handicap is such that they cannot appreciate life’s 
basic values, the question of whether their existence is worth continuing, becomes 
crucial. At this point, parents, with the recommendations from doctors must make the 
painful decision of whether to prolong a life that is not benefiting the neonates, or to 
allow them to die. This is indeed difficult, and if possible, should be avoided.
Medical advancement, in the form of genetic screening tests and gene therapy, may 
have come up with a solution. Genetic screening tests have already been developed and 
are widely implemented in the UK. There are still further developments to be made in 
this field, such as a more accurate measurement of the severity of the abnormality in the 
foetus. In the future, genetic screening tests will be offered to everyone and would have 
a valuable function in preventing severely handicapped neonates. The medical staff 
will have the duty of informing parents of the likely condition of the child, but the 
decision of whether to carry the foetus full term, or to have an abortion, should lie with 
the parents. There are many types of genetic screening tests available, and the decision 
to take the tests, should also lie with the individual, for their fixture may be affected by 
knowing too much.
104
Gene therapy is an alternative form of treatment, and should be developed and used for 
severely handicapped neonates and patients that cannot be treated otherwise. Severely 
handicapped neonates would benefit greatly from this treatment, as it may be possible 
for their abnormality to be treated through the use of somatic gene therapy or germ-line 
therapy. Germ-line therapy can however be abused to alter genetic codes in persons. 
Because this may affect future generations, this form of treatment should be limited to 
therapeutic uses only. International sanctions is vital so that no country would enter 
into a ‘slippery slope’ scenario, and threaten other nations as a result. However, the 
possibility and advantages of gene therapy are great, and should be utilised in a way that 
would benefit human kind.
The problem of severely handicapped neonates will continue for a while. Hopefully in 
the near future, by ensuring that all neonates with abnormalities can be treated, there 
will not be any need to make painful life or death decisions. This way the neonates will 
have a chance at enjoying and appreciating life to its fullest.
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Appendices
Types of Screening available in the UK:
Chorionic Villus1 Sampling: A procedure whereby a small sample of chorionic 
(placental) tissue, which shares the genetic make up of the fetus, is removed for 
prenatal diagnosis. It is usually performed at about 10 weeks of pregnancy with only 
minimal discomfort and often allows a genetic diagnosis to be achieved before 12 
weeks’ of gestation. The obtained cells undergo chromosomal and biochemical studies 
to detennine if any abnormalities are present. This enables the prenatal diagnosis of 
such congenital disorders as Down’s syndrome and thalassaemia2. CVS requires first- 
class ultrasound and an expert and well-trained team. The risks are higher than for 
aminocentesis: an MRC trial gave 2-4% excess miscarriage risk.3
Fetal blood and tissue sampling: Fetal blood sampling is used for a variety of purposes: 
for example, for the diagnosis of the haemoglobin disorders and haemophilia when 
DNA diagnosis is not possible, and for the assessment of rhesus haemolytic disease. It 
can be performed safely only after the seventeenth week of pregnancy and only by 
experts. The initial, highly specialised technique of fetoscopy has now been replaced 
by the safer and less specialised technique of ultrasound-guided transabodominal needle 
puncture of the fetal cord insertion. The risk figure for cordocentesis is 2%.4
1 Chorionic villus: Function o f the villus is to absorb the products of digestion. Chorionic villi are folds of 
the chorion (the outer membrane surrounding a fetus) from which the fetal part o f the placenta is formed. 
They provide and extensive area for the exchange of oxygen, carbon dioxide, nutrients, and waste products 
between maternal and fetal blood. (Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary. Fourth Edition. Oxford. Oxford 
University Press, 1996, page 125
2 Thalassaemia: An abnormality in the protein part of the haemoglobin molecule. The affected red cells 
cannot function normally, leading to anaemia. Other symptoms include enlargement of the spleen and 
abnormalities of the bone marrow. Individuals inheriting the disease from both parents are severely 
affected {thalassaemia major), but those inheriting it from only one parent are usually symptom free. 
Patients with the major disease are treated with repeated blood transfusion. The disease can be detected 
by prenatal diagnosis. {Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary. Fourth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996, page 656
3 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. Genetic Screening - Ethical Issues. June 1996, page 115
4 Ibid
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Rhesus Haemolytic disease and rubella (German measles): Antenatal screening tests 
are carried out on all women for rhesus haemolytic disease and rubella. Rubella was 
the first screening programme undertaken with the objective of offering detection and 
abortion of potentially affected fetuses. Severe congenital disorders can result from 
rubella infection during pregnancy. Both rhesus and rubella screening appear to be well 
accepted. Whereas the finding of a rhesus negative blood group results in preventive 
treatment, a positive rubella test gives rise to the need for very painful decisions.
Insulin dependent diabetes mellitus: The offspring of women with insulin dependent 
diabetes mellitus have an increased risk of stillbirth, neonatal ill health, and major 
congenital malformations, especially iof their diabetes is poorly controlled. In many 
women with diabetes the diagnosis will already be known, but all women are screened 
early in pregnancy by blood and urine tests to detect undiagnosed cases. Expert fetal 
anomaly scanning by ultrasound is offered to all those having the condition.
Cystic fibrosis: Pilot studies of screening during pregnancy for carriers for the common 
disorder cystic fibross are currently being undertaken in a number of centres. In the 
UK, 85-90% of carriers can be detected by a simple DNA screening test based on a 
mouthwash sample.
Maternal serum screening: Maternal serum screening tests have been developed that 
can be offered to all pregnant women to detect those who may be at increased risk of 
having a child with Down’s syndrome regardless of age, in order to offer them the 
choice of amniocentesis and chromosome testing. This type of screening is now 
entering widespread practice and it is estimated that nearly 70% of British districts and 
health boards have opted to introduce such screening. There are, however, major 
problems. There is a high false positive rate (about 65 false positives for every true 
positive or about 1 pregnancy in 10) and false negative rate (about 40%).
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